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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Scope and structure of the thesis 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the international law regulating the non-navigational utilization of 
international watercourses. Its core element is an analysis of the juridical arguments of the 
parties to the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse in order to determine whether they are in 
accordance with the applicable international law in this field. The analysis will firstly require 
an examination of the applicable main principles of international law for the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses. By this method I aim to combine a 
theoretical analysis of the applicable international law with an analysis of the problems in a 
specific case of high complexity and importance. 
The main research question is however whether the legal arguments of the parties to the 
Tigris-Euphrates watercourse in accordance with the applicable international law.  
 
An international watercourse is any naturally connected system of waters that forms or 
crosses the border between two or more states.1 The water of such watercourses will be 
located within the territories of several states. As for international watercourses in the form 
of rivers, the available quantity and quality of water in each state is dependent on the 
utilization of the other watercourse states. When water is consumed by an upstream state, 
the amount of water flowing into the downstream states decreases. Depending on the 
utilization, the quality of the water might also well be affected; return flow from agriculture 
or industry might pollute the water and render it unsuitable for domestic use. Dam 
projects, irrigation and sales of water as a commercial product also affects the total water 
supply. Thus the utilization in one part of the watercourse will create consequences for the 
consummation in other parts. In arid areas of the world, water is a scarce resource and any 
negative change in the water supply can give fatal results, and also be a source of 
interregional or international conflict. 
 
It is on this background of high importance to develop international legal principles and 
regulations for division and utilization of the water in international watercourses in order to 
avoid conflict and secure a sustainable and equitable development. A vast body of 
international law in this area exists, and the question is how the rules of international law 
regulating the utilization of international watercourses should be interpreted in order to 
create a reasonable and sustainable solution that apportions the water resources equitably 
between the watercourse states, without deteriorating the watercourse.  
 
This in turn raises questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction; would a restriction of the 
utilization of the territorial waters be a violation of the sovereignty of the watercourse 
states? Does the principle of state sovereignty have natural restrictions? Does the 
jurisdiction of the territory mean ownership to and free usage of its water? Furthermore it 
reveals the legal tension between the sovereignty as an agent of self-sufficiency, and 
modern principles for environmental protection and equitable apportionment; does every 
                                                 
1
 The definition of the term ’international watercourse’ is a subject of dispute between Turkey, Iraq 
and Syria, and will be discussed further in chapter 5.2 
 4 
watercourse state have a basic legal right to utilize the watercourse? What factors are of 
importance in determining the allocation of water from an international watercourse, and 
how should the relevant factors be balanced? 
 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq have yet failed to reach a tripartite agreement concerning the 
utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse, and the tension between them is variably 
high. The main question to be addressed in this regard is how the ruling principles of 
international water law are commonly interpreted, and whether the Turkish-Syrian-Iraqi 
perception of these principles is in harmony with the international one. Is the Tigris-
Euphrates in fact an international watercourse? May Iraq’s ancient uses give an extended 
right to utilization? Can a Turkish claim for sovereignty be an obstruction for an equitable 
allocation of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse? 
 
 
 
In the next subchapter follows a brief reflection on water as a subject of dispute. In addition 
to being a vital human need, water is also a great source to power; both because it ensures 
development and progress to the states who have good access to it, but also because it 
may become a valuable currency towards states with a poorer water supply. The 
subchapter will examine some of the central factors leading to water conflict, and point at 
the dynamic between watercourse states in order to give a broader perspective on water as 
a unique source of conflict. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the sources of international law, as defined by article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and will examine both the specific sources of 
relevance to the matter in question, and the legal method of international law. In the field 
of international water law, and especially the law of international watercourses, the legal 
sources are essentially customary, and the chapter will give a brief presentation of the state 
practice, judicial decisions and treaty law that are employed in the later analysis. The aim of 
this chapter is to establish the sources of law and their applicability, in order to create a 
foundation for the following parts of the thesis. 
 
Further, in chapter 3, follows a short historical background of the legal situation of 
transboundary watercourses. The fist and second part of the chapter gives examples of the 
development of international law in the field of transboundary watercourses, while the 
third part is devoted to the political and hydrological situation in the Tigris-Euphrates basin, 
leading up to the present situation. This chapter will enlighten the earlier stages and 
positions in international water law and the three parties’ common history, in order to 
establish a wider context for questions debated later in the thesis. 
 
The applicable international law for transboundary watercourses is addressed in chapter 4. 
Out of the four major theories of water allocation, the discussion in chapter 4 will 
concentrate on the two theories that are most relevant for the scope of this thesis; the 
theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, and the theory of limited territorial sovereignty. 
This examination necessitates a preliminary discussion of the principle of state 
sovereignty’s content and magnitude. The principle is central in international law and a 
fundamental prerequisite in all bi- and multilateral instruments. Establishing the status of 
this principle is substantial for the further scrutiny. A main question here is whether 
sovereignty allows each watercourse state to exploit the water on its territory freely, or if 
the sovereignty has inherent restrictions.  
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The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is only examined briefly, whereas the theory 
of limited territorial sovereignty undergoes a more thorough analysis. The selection of 
topics in the chapter is motivated by the arguments of the Tigris-Euphrates riparians that 
are the subjects of analysis in chapter 5. The main question in chapter 4 is whether the 
theory of limited territorial sovereignty is applicable international law, and further to 
explore its essential principles and delimitations. The aim of this chapter is to present both 
a theoretical and a practical picture of the applicable international law of transboundary 
watercourses. This also displays the challenges of the principle of equitable utilization as an 
applicable rule, since it has no immediate content, but must be interpreted according to the 
factual situation of each conflict.  
 
The establishment of the applicable international rules then induces the analysis of the 
legal aspects of the Tigris-Euphrates conflict, in chapter 5. Analyses of judicial disputes of 
the parties, in light of the principal theories and the findings in chapter 4, will reveal 
whether their arguments are in harmony with international law. In addition to this, the two 
bilateral water agreements will be examined, and the parties’ earlier proposals for the 
management of the watercourse will be compared. This chapter aims to break up the 
arguments of the three parties, and see how they relate to the ruling principles. This may 
give an understanding of the complexity of the management of international watercourses, 
especially in areas where the dissimilarity between the parties is considerable. It also points 
on the strengths and weaknesses of international law and the obstacles it encounters in the 
process of finding peaceful solutions. 
 
Lastly, in chapter 6, the thesis looks briefly at the possible future scenarios for cooperation 
in the Tigris-Euphrates basin in light of the recent development. The similarities of the 
riparians are enlightened, as well as the conditions for future cooperation. In addition the 
chapter tentatively suggests shifting the focus from the sharing of water to the sharing of 
benefits. The aim of this last unit is to present some new thinking on the possible ways to 
cooperate over water management. 
 
 
 
In the early years of international water law, the main topic of regulation was the 
navigational rights.  This has gradually changed over the years, and the navigational rights 
are now only a minor part of international water law. Since the topic of the present master 
thesis is the allotment of rights to consume and utilize a watercourse, the navigational 
rights will not be debated. 
 
The thesis will neither enter into discussions regarding the contents of the international 
obligation to prevent harm-causing activities to other watercourse states. This principle 
focuses on the causing of factual harm between watercourse states, while the main topic of 
the thesis is the causing of legal harm and the principle of equitable utilization. Although a 
comparison of these two principles rise highly interesting questions, the limitation of the 
thesis does not allow any entrance into the world of factual harm. 
 
 
 
In order to discuss the legal issues, it is essential to understand the factual and legal issues 
concerning water conflicts, and the particularity of water in this context. The following 
subchapter will endeavour to present some of the circumstances and causes that may lead 
to water conflicts. 
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1.2 Background: Water as a subject of dispute 
 
 
Water is the source of life and conditional to human existence. Both the planet earth and 
the human body consist mainly of water and it is the one natural resource we are the most 
dependent of; for domestic use, to cook and clean, in the production of food or industrial 
goods, and also as an alternative source for power and electricity. But most of all, the 
human body needs fresh drinking water daily and cannot survive long without it. Out of the 
total volume of water on the planet, only around 2,5 % is freshwater. Out of this quantity, 
70 % is ice and 30 % groundwater. Only mere 0,3 % of the world’s water reserve is available 
to us in lakes and rivers.2 Corresponding to the population growth, the consumption of 
available freshwater also increases. Research show that water consumption has grown 
twice as fast as the population the last century; the world’s population grows with roughly 
80 million persons a year, while the consummation of fresh water increases with 64 billion 
m3 per year.3  The world’s population now appropriates 54 % of the freshwater in rivers, 
lakes and groundwater resources.4 Furthermore the water consumption is not apportioned 
equally; while the 8 % of the world’s population that lives in North and Central America 
consumes 1861 m3 yearly per capita, the Asian 60 % of the world population consumes 
merely 519 m3 yearly per capita.5 
 
Around 70 % of the appropriated freshwater is used for irrigation. Climate changes 
challenges the traditional agricultural production, the temperatures rise, many areas 
experience less rain, and often the rain carries pollution. Production of food necessitates 
extensive amounts of water. A human being needs 2-4 litres of drinking water daily, but to 
produce one person’s daily food supply, 2000-5000 litres of water is required.6 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1 800 million 
people will be living in areas with absolute water scarcity by 2025, and two-thirds of the 
world’s population could be under stress conditions.7 Thus it is of fundamental importance 
to reach agreements on the optimal, sustainable and equitable use of international 
watercourses. 
 
Because of its unique qualities, water differs from other conflict-causing subjects. Firstly, 
water is a free and fungible natural resource. From nature’s side, a river flows freely and 
unhindered through a geographical landscape. It will often rise in a mountainous area, and 
flow through various landscapes on its way to the sea. The river is part of a natural 
ecosystem, contributing to and benefitting from all other resources within this system. 
When international borders are drawn across the river, and divide it into two or more parts 
each situated in a separate State, an unnatural delimitation is imposed on the river. When 
divided into national fragments, the utilization of the water resources becomes subject to 
national jurisdiction. Gaining the ownership to the water in a specific part of a river may 
seem strange, since the water flowing through today is not the same water as will be 
flowing in the same spot tomorrow.  
                                                 
2
 UN Water, statistics 
3
 Worldometers statistics: www.worldometers.info/water/ 
4
 Ibid 
5
 Data360: www.data360.org 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Ibid 
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Because of its vital importance to human existence and its central role in the modern 
industrial society, water is also a considerable source of power. In his famous work 
“Oriental Despotism” from 1957, German historian Karl August Wittfogel introduced his 
theory on the evolution of powerful hydraulic societies.8 He claims that the rise of many 
oriental societies was linked to their early development and organisation of water 
resources. The control over watercourses and the channelling of large quantities of water 
required mass labour, which again had to be coordinated and lead. Wittfogel believes that 
the organisation of water exploitation lead to the development of bureaucratic 
governmental structures. This theory seems quite descriptive for the Mesopotamian 
civilizations, where humans early developed methods to dominate water resources. 
Irrigation, the action of channelling water from a watercourse and into agricultural fields, 
was carried out in the area already in the 4th or 5th century BC.9 The first known artificial 
constructed canal, led water from the Tigris River to an irrigated area in Girsu in Southern 
Iraq.10 Dams were also constructed to ensure a more stable supply of water, and later also 
to produce hydropower. Also Egypt has gained power and structural advantages from her 
early development of the Nile River.11 
 
Cooperation is also a decisive factor in water conflicts. Many watercourses are 
international, either flowing through several states, or on the borders of two or more 
states. 145 nations have their territory within an international basin.12 When the water 
resources are shared between states, the water supply for each state will depend on the 
other states’ utilization. Unilateral development of a watercourse often leads to exhaustion 
of the resource and problems of scarcity and pollution.  As these problems grow, states 
experience increasing difficulties of satisfying their demand for water. Barrages and dams 
are built to secure the water supply in the territory of the states building them. This again 
leads to an even weaker flow in the river for downstream riparians, and also, in many cases, 
to a decline of water quality. The factual situation is thus often characterized by two 
problems; increasing demand for, and decreasing supply of water. 
 
In his article “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Garrett Hardin describes how it is tempting 
for humans to exploit the commons since it brings a positive utility to each exploiter, while 
the negative utility is shared by all, and therefore is quite small for each individual agent: 
“[e]ach man is locked to a system that compels him to increase [his use] without limit – in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his 
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all”.13  Although similar in many ways, the situation for 
transboundary watercourses differs from Hardin’s hypothesis. In the eagerness to secure 
the water supply for its own population, states exploit the common watercourses and 
receive a positive utility. But the negative utility - draught, scarcity, pollution, and enfeebled 
wildlife and vegetation – is not shared by all the riparians, but transferred, in most cases, 
from the upper riparians to the lower ones. Exploiting a transboundary watercourse freely 
may therefore be auspicious for an upper riparian, since it brings him a full positive utility, 
                                                 
8
 Wittfogel, Karl August, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Power, New Haven 1957 
9
 Goldsmith, Edvard and Hildyard, Nicholas, The Social and Environmental Effect of Large Dams: 
Volume 1, Overview, Wadebridge 1984, chapter 25. 
10
 Ibid 
11
 McCaffrey Steven, The Law of International Watercourses, Oxford 2007, 2
nd
 edition 2010, page 261 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Hardin, Garrett, ”The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, vol. 162 (1968), 1243-1248 (page 1244) 
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and no consequences. Naturally, such exploitation will trigger reaction from the lower 
riparian states, and also possibly give rise to conflicts.  
 
The lack of trust amongst the watercourse states is also a factor that can create and 
increase a conflict over water. As Paul A. Williams describes, states often have difficulties to 
ascertain whether other states are defensively motivated in their water management or 
more offensively driven, and thereby “they inherently mistrust each other and prefer to be 
as self-sufficient as possible”.14 Williams’ view would be highly relevant in the Middle-East, 
where water scarcity is evolving and many of the neighbouring states have suffered 
centuries of territorial rivalry and war. Between old rivalry states, it might be difficult to 
determine whether a neighbour state is seeking security or power.15 States may see the 
precious and hard-won sovereignty as threatened by neighbouring states’ management of 
a watercourse, both because the downstream state fears a reduction of its own future 
development possibilities; and also because of the fear of being dependent on the water 
supply from an upstream state that was more progressive in the development of water 
management projects. However, in the battle for a secure and sufficient water supply, the 
states are more likely “to destroy the resource than each other”.16 Trust, cooperation and 
exchange of information are thereby decisive factors for an equitable and sustainable 
utilization of an international watercourse. 
 
Already in the 1980’s, United States’ government intelligence services predicted that there 
were at least 10 places in the world where water, not oil, would be the main subject to 
conflict and also, possibly, to war; Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Malta and the Arabian peninsula 
being some of the countries facing severe water scarcity.17 Even if this point of view has 
been acknowledged by many scholars and politicians, others, like Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
argue that water wars are unlikely because “(w)ater is simply too critical a resource to fight 
over”.18 However likely water wars might be, the best way to create trust between the 
riparians and to avoid war over water is, as the present thesis will show, to achieve a legal 
agreement on the utilization of a watercourse, concluded by its riparians and based on 
clear and applicable legal rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Williams, Paul A., “Turkey’s Water Diplomacy: A theoretical Discussion”, Turkey’s Water Policy, 
Kibaroglu et al. (eds), Berlin Heidelberg, 2011,  pages 197-214 (page 199) 
15
 Ibid 
16
 Ibid, page 201 
17
 Starr, Joyce R., ”Water wars”, Foreign Policy (Spring 1991), pages 17-36 (page 17) 
18
 Dellapenna, Joseph W., “Rivers as Legal Structures: The Examples of the Jordan and the Nile”, 36 
Natural Resources Journal, 1996, pages 217-250 (page 220) 
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2 Sources of Law 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The legal landscape of international water law is multifaceted, with an abundance of 
agreements and participants. It is widely recognized that article 38 of the statute of the 
International Court of Justice determines the sources of international law.19 According to its 
first paragraph, the court shall apply the sources mentioned in the article while making 
decisions “in accordance with international law”. The provision further states that rules and 
principles of international law must derive from international conventions, international 
custom, general principles of international law, or judicial decisions and teachings of “the 
most highly qualified publicists”. These are the sources that will be examined in the present 
chapter. 
 
 
 
2.2 International conventions 
 
 
“[I]nternational conventions” in the ICJ status, article 38 litra a, can be “general or 
particular” and they establish “rules expressly recognized by the contesting states”. A 
convention is commonly known as an agreement between two or more states, concerning a 
specific or general subject, where the states in question commit to certain behaviour they 
would not be legally bound to in absence of the treaty.20 Concerning the law of 
international watercourses, only one such convention exists: 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
 
On the 21st of May 1997, a large majority of the United Nation General Assembly adopted 
the “United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses” (hereafter the ‘UNWC’). According to its article 36, the convention only 
enters into force “on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession”. Since the number of such 
instruments at present is twenty-five, the UN Convention has not entered into force.21 
This necessitates a discussion of the convention’s relevance for the international 
community. 
                                                 
19
 Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, fifth edition, Cambridge 2003, page 66; Cassese, Antonio, 
International Law, Oxford 2001, page 119 
20
 Thirlway, Hugh, “The Sources of International Law”, International Law, Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), 
Oxford 2010 pages 95-121 (page 100). 
21
 Parties to the convention are at present; Burkina Faso, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Namibia, 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia and Uzbekistan (United Nation’s Treaty Collection) 
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As the large majority of votes in the UN General Assembly witness, the UNWC received 
broad consent amongst the UN Member States. The convention had also been long 
negotiated in the International Law Commission (ILC) Working Group, which, according to 
special rapporteur Steven McCaffrey, was “a forum in which virtually any interested state 
could participate and [the adopted convention] therefore reflects the views of the 
international community on the subject”.22 Due to its large approval in the General 
Assembly, it seems safe to say that the grand majority of Member States agreed on the 
general principles of international water law, although the process of its entry into force 
has been slow. 
 
Additionally, the mandate given to the ILC Working Group by the UN General Assembly was 
to “take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses 
with a view to its progressive development and codification”.23 The convention is thereby, 
partly declaratory of pre-existing international custom and partly emerging principles with 
broad acceptance. As stated in the “North Sea Continental Shelf”-case, “a convention 
adopted as part of the combined process of codification and progressive development of 
international law may well constitute, or come to constitute the decisive evidence of 
generally accepted new rules of international law”.24  The UNWC is of course binding upon 
the States who are member to it, according to art. 18 litra a of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. The convention is thereby a binding legal source for to Syria who has 
ratified it, and Iraq who has acceded to it, but has no force, as a treaty, for Turkey who 
voted against it.25 Nevertheless, the UNWC might be legally binding for Turkey if it is, fully 
or partly, a codification of international customary law. This question will be debated in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
 
2.3 International custom 
 
 
Customary rules are rules of law that derives from traditional rules of behaviour. They 
develop subconsciously within a group of actors and eventually reach a level of historical 
legitimacy.26 Customary rules, although giving “rise to rules binding on all members of the 
[international] community”, they also “ultimately rest[…] on consent”.27 Not only the 
behaviour of states, but also that of international organisations can create customary 
international law. 28 
 
In order to be regarded as “international custom”, according to the ICJ-statute article 38 
litra b, a rule must be a “general practice accepted as law”. The article thus sets conditions 
both for the states’ actions and for their conceptions. This duality was articulated by the ICJ 
                                                 
22
 McCaffrey, 2010, page 376 
23
 UN Audiovisual Library of International Law : 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html 
24
 “The North Sea Continental Shelf” case, ICJ, 1969 (disserting opinion), see also McCaffrey, 2010, 
page 375 
25
 United Nations Treaty Collection, voting records for the UNWC 
26
 Shaw, 2003, page 68 
27
 Cassese, 2001, page 117 
28
 Shaw, 2003, page 78  
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in the “North Sea Continental Shelf”-cases: “Not only must the acts concerned amount to a 
settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a rule of law requiring it […] The States concerned must therefore feel that they 
are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”.29 The evaluation thus contains both 
a practical and a psychological aspect. Consequently, a rule of international custom must be 
practiced by one state towards one or several other states - or be practiced in such a way 
that it affects other states, and thereby is capable of provoking a reaction - and the 
performing state must carry out its action in the belief that it is obliged to do so. 30,31 
 
The question is hence whether bi- or multilateral treaties concerning the allocation of water 
from an international watercourse can be considered as expressions of state practice in this 
regard. 
 
The term ‘state practice’ gives associations to actions or statements made by states, which 
expresses a legal opinion, and which concerns or is able to provoke a reaction from other 
states. According to Akehurst, “State practice covers any act or statement by a State from 
which views can be inferred about international law”.32 A wide understanding of the term is 
also used by Thirlway, who declares that “custom grows form action by one subject of law 
which is either accepted, rejected, or tolerated by the other subjects of international 
law”.33 The term ‘state practice’ can thus be interpreted broadly.  
 
Regarding the customary law of international watercourses, the practice between states is 
essentially expressed through bi- and multilateral treaties that regulates the utilization of a 
shared watercourse. A bi- or multilateral treaty is clearly both a statement and an act; it 
expresses a legal opinion and creates duties and rights for the subjects involved.  
But as these treaties are primarily binding upon the states that are parties to them, a bi- or 
multilateral treaty can not generate rights or obligations for a third party unless a 
substantial number of agreements states the same rules and principles and may be seen as 
an expression of a general conception of the law in the field.  
 
Bi- or multilateral treaties concerning the allocation of water from an international 
watercourse can thus be considered as expressions of state practice. 
 
 
Consequently, in order to be relevant as source of customary law, the State practice must 
be accompanied by opinio juris. The legal weight of state practice is proportional to its 
quantity and frequency.34 State practice concerning the management of international 
watercourses is voluminous. As it is impossible to produce and analyze all relevant 
watercourse treaties, only some of the most distinct and significant agreements will be 
discussed: 
                                                 
29
 The ”North Sea Continental Shelf”-case, ICJ reports 1969, paragraph 77. Although the court here 
actually discusses whether a treaty provision may become a rule of customary law, the analysis 
concerns the nature and creation of customary law in general, and is therefore relevant. 
30
 See Thirlway, 2010, page 103 
31
 Akehurst claims that it is not “necessary that the State making such statements believes them to 
be true; what is necessary is that the statements are not challenged by other States”, see Akehurst, 
Michael, “Custom as a Source of International Law”, British Journal of International Law,  1976, 
pages 1-53 (page 53) 
32
 Akehurst, 1976, page 10 
33
 Thirlway, 2010, page 104 
34
 Ibid, page 53 
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The Indus Waters Treaty, from 1960, where India and Pakistan agree on the utilization of 
the river and defines the watercourse as a system of rivers, and which also offers important 
factors for determining the allocation.  
 
The Mahakali Treaty, concluded in 1996, which establishes the framework for a 
cooperation project between India and Tibet, and provides guidelines for the 
environmental protection of the watercourse’s ecosystem and for the cooperation between 
the watercourse states.  
 
The Ganges River Treaty was adopted between India and Bangladesh in 1996, and 
contributes to the present study with factors for distribution and cooperation, especially 
through the creation of a joint committee.  
 
The Rio Grande treaty is still in force between Mexico and the USA, although several times 
modified. It was adopted in 1944 and governs the utilization of the border part of the river. 
Also this treaty offers interesting aspects on the cooperation between the parties, but also 
differing views on the equality of the watercourse states. The first treaty between the 
parties, subsequent to the disputes in the late 1800’s, was concluded in 1906, and is also 
relevant for the present study.   
 
Syrian-Turkish agreement 
During the construction of the Turkish Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates, Turkey and Syria 
concluded a protocol to secure the flow of the river into Syria. The protocol was signed in 
1987, and guarantees a minimum yearly average flow of 500 m3/sec crossing their common 
border.  The agreement has been debated between the riparians, both in regards to its 
obligation and to its applicability. These aspects will be discussed in chapter 5.3.1 
 
Syrian-Iraqi Memorandum of Understanding 
Subsequent to the Turkish-Syrian agreement, Iraq and Syria adopted a Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning the provisional division of the water in the Euphrates River that 
flows into Syria from Turkey. The agreement accords 58 % of the water to Iraq and 42 % to 
Syria, but the exact quantity of water is dependent on the accomplishment of the Turkish-
Syrian agreement. The memorandum is the object of discussion in chapter 5.3.2 
 
 
 
2.4 Judicial Decisions 
 
 
Judicial Decisions are recognized as a source of international law in article 38 litra d of the 
ICJ-statute, which states that “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations” are “subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law”.  
 
The term “judicial decisions” is not limited to decisions from the ICJ itself, but decisions 
from other international courts and from municipal courts as well.35 Nevertheless, article 59 
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of the statute declares that the “decisions of the Court has no binding force except 
between the parties and in respect of that particular case”. This article emphasizes the role 
of judicial decisions as a subsidiary source of law.  
 
However, such decisions apply to all states as advisory arguments in resolving water 
allocation conflicts. They can be of great importance since international courts strive to 
follow their previous judgements and since national courts and international courts of 
arbitration quote the judgements of international courts as authoritative decisions.36 But in 
a dynamic field like international watercourses, the law will change over time and 
statements in elder judgement might eventually lose their adequacy. In employing elder 
judicial decisions as a source of international law, it is thus important to establish their 
relevance in the modern conception of international water law. 
 
The following three judgements from international courts have played a specific role in the 
development of the law of international watercourses: 
 
The “River Oder”-judgement 
In this judgement from 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice was asked to 
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder, 
namely whether it extended to include two of the rivers tributaries that were situated 
entirely on Polish territory. The International Commission of the Oder consisted of 
members from the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden 
and Poland. 
 
The Court concluded that the solution had to be sought in the “community of interests of 
riparian States”, and further that this “community of interests in a navigable river becomes 
the basis of a common legal right”.37 The judgement was one of the first to establish the 
equality of the watercourse states, and has played a central role in the development of the 
modern law of international watercourses. The question concerned navigational rights, but 
has later been acknowledged to express general principles.38 The central views of this 
judgement were restated by the ICJ in the “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros”-judgement in 1997. 
 
The “Lake Lanoux”-arbitration 
Disagreement arose between France and Spain when France planned a hydroelectric 
project that would divert water from the Lake Lanoux into the Ariège River in France. The 
lake is situated near the French-Spanish border, but entirely on French territory. A diversion 
of water from the lake would reduce the flow of the Carol River flowing from the lake and 
into Spanish territory, and the project therefore provoked strong Spanish reactions. 
 
The Court of Arbitration (1957) concluded, inter alia, that France had no duty to await 
Spain’s consent towards the project, as long as the diversion had no significant 
consequences for the downstream riparian. The arbitration adjudicates the relation 
between the upstream and downstream riparians, and their duties towards each other. 
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The “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project”-judgement 
On the 25th of September 1997, the International Court of Justice passed its judgement 
concerning the long lasting dispute between Slovakia and Hungary, over their initially 
common project on the Danube – the Gabčikovo -Nagymaros Project. The countries had 
adopted a co-operational treaty already in 1977, “concerning the construction and 
operation of the Gabčikovo -Nagymaros system of locks” on the Danube.39 The project was 
situated in both states - Gabčikovo in Slovakia (at the time Czechoslovakia), and Nagymaros 
in Hungary.  
 
The court was asked to decide if Hungary was entitled to abandon her international 
commitment, and also whether Slovakia violated international water law by exploiting the 
river resources without Hungary’s consent. The judgement refers to the UN convention on 
the law of the Non-Navigational uses of international watercourses, adopted only months 
earlier, when it states that the principle of equitable utilization is the ruling principle of the 
law of international watercourses, and that the Slovakian continuation of the project was a 
breach of the proportionality of international law. The judgement has great relevance for 
the present analysis, since it is both recent and declaratory of the roles and rights of the 
watercourse states.  
 
 
Teachings of the “most highly qualified publicists” is the last source of international law 
that is mentioned in the ICJ status art. 38. The present study relies on the views and 
research of several internationally recognized scholars, and these will be acknowledged 
when they appear in the text. 
 
 
Before attacking the legal issues, a short retrospect on the development of international 
water law and the conflict in the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse will give a useful background 
for the analysis in chapter 4 and 5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Development of International Water Law 
 
 
 
3.1 Development of ancient water law 
 
 
As the oldest civilizations we know of were founded on access to water in the river valleys 
of Mesopotamia, China and Egypt, the world’s oldest legal regulations also concern the 
access to water. Concluded in the year 3100 BC, the treaty between the ancient 
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Mesopotamian cities of Lagash and Umma is considered the world’s first written treaty. The 
conflict between the two cities was only one amongst several disputes over water supply, 
and erupted after Umma violated an earlier division of waters.40  The treaty was engraved 
on a stone monument, in the Sumerian language.41 Apparently, the ruler of Kish, a 
neighbouring community to the two rivals and probably a regional authority, set the stone 
and it is said that the treaty even had a clause of arbitration.42 The parties agreed, through 
the treaty, to build a new boundary canal for diversion of water from the Euphrates. 
 
The Babylonian king Hammurabi codified the oldest extant laws during his reign from 1792 
to 1750 BC. The laws of Hammurabi were not really a pure codification of the existing laws, 
as Hammurabi viewed himself as a legislator, but rather an expression of legal principles 
and case law.43 However, the laws regulate the irrigation of water for agriculture, and also 
the responsibility of the farmers to maintain the irrigation canals so as not to cause harm to 
others by flooding or misleading water. Mentioning of larger canals also indicate that the 
system of diverting water from rivers was organized, and regulated by legal rules. 
 
In ancient Rome, the principle of aquae pluviae arcendae actio (action to ward off the 
water) protected lower properties against diversion of water. The rainwater was seen as a 
gift from nature, and any action or installation that prevented the rainwater from flowing 
freely, was seen as illegal. The only exceptions were diversion for agricultural purposes, 
since this was considered to be the heart and pride of the civilization. The Roman Law thus 
permitted actions against anyone who caused harm upon someone else by diverting the 
water or otherwise prevented the water from flowing freely, and receiving water from a 
higher land was actually viewed as servitude upon the lower land.44  In this view, both the 
higher and the lower land had a favourable and a restricted position: the higher land had 
the advantage of the rainwater flowing on and through it, but was at the same time obliged 
not to obstruct the flow into the lower land; and the lower land is in its turn benefited from 
the obligation upon the higher land by receiving the flow of water, but had nevertheless a 
corresponding servitude to accept the water on its territory. 
 
 
In these historical examples, the rules and principles of water control relate to private law 
between citizens. The modern concept of state was not yet established, and the disputes 
were therefore local and interregional. Nevertheless, as the principles have developed over 
a long period of time due to the absence of law making powers, they are significant for the 
modern conception of water law and constitute the basis for the applicable law of 
international water courses.  
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3.2 Development of modern water law 
 
 
The legal philosopher Hugo Grotius, by many considered to be the founder of modern 
international law, writes in “Rights of War and Peace” that “[r]ivers may be occupied by a 
country, not including the stream above or that below its own territories. But the waters 
which wash its lands form an inseparable part of the current, making its way to the main 
sea. For to constitute the right to property in this channel, it is sufficient that its sides, 
inclosed by the banks of that territory form its greatest part, and that the river itself 
compared with the land, makes but a small portion”.45  Further he states that “[r]ivers 
separating two powers may be occupied by both, to each of whom their use and 
advantages may be equal”.46 In the case of border rivers, he claims that changes in the river 
and its original appearance, invites us to consider whether it still is the same river. “For as a 
river may be entirely destroyed by the erection of dams upon the higher parts of its stream, 
or by digging of canals, which carry off its waters in another direction: so by the desertation 
of its old channel, and breaking out for itself another course, it will not continue to be the 
same river it was before, but will be completely a new one”.47  
 
A similar view was also brought forward by US Attorney General, Judson Harmon, in the 
dispute between USA and Mexico regarding the allocation of resources in the Rio Grande 
from 1895 to 1906. Upon a request from Mexican authorities for an agreement on 
allocation of the river resources, Harmon wrote an opinion on behalf of the US Department 
of State, where  he concludes that “[t]he immediate as well as the possible consequences 
of the right asserted by Mexico show that its recognition is entirely inconsistent with the 
sovereignty of the United States over its own domain” and thus “the rules, principles, and 
precedents of international law impose no liability or obligation upon the United States”.48  
Harmon’s opinion asserts that a state is in its full right to exploit the natural resources 
which lies within it’s territory at all times, without regard to or responsibility for the 
consequences that such a use can throw upon other riparian states.  
 
As the consumption of water has increased during the last century, the views on the legal 
rights to utilization have changed. A great contributor to this was the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, and their judgement in the “River Oder”-case in 1929. Here the Court 
stated that the watercourse states had a common legal right to utilize the resources, and 
established the legal equality between them. This change of conception led to the 
International Law Association’s “Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers” of 1966, which was a codification of the general customary rules that had 
developed, and which presented the equitable utilization as the ruling principle for the 
management of international watercourses.49 The rules were an inducement for the United 
Nations General Assembly who recommended in a resolution of 1970, that the 
International Law Commission should start the process of studying and codifying the law of 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.50 This process led of course to the 
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UNWC of 1997, but was also a source of inspiration for a great number of treaties 
concerning international watercourses. 
 
 
 
3.3 Development of water law in Mesopotamia: A short 
summary of the Tigris-Euphrates conflict 
 
 
With a view to the debate over the legal landscape of international watercourses and the 
analysis of the judicial polemic, it is necessary to provide a short introduction to the factual 
situation in the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse and between the three riparians. 
 
The Euphrates River is an international river that originates in the mountains of South-
Eastern Turkey, and flows through Syria and Iraq where it forms, together with the Tigris 
River, the Shatt al-Arab which empties into the Persian Gulf. Likewise, the Tigris River is also 
an international river that springs out in the Turkish mountains, only a few kilometres from 
the origin of the Euphrates. The Tigris, however, runs directly south where it constitutes the 
border between Syria and Turkey for 44 kilometres, before flowing into and through Iraq. 
The Shatt al-Arab is created north of Basra, where the twin rivers meet. The last part of the 
Shatt al-Arab constitutes the border between Iraq and Iran. However, Iran has not yet 
expressed any demand for the right to exploit the water of the Shatt al-Arab, as she has 
several other valuable rivers on her territory. Iran is therefore excluded from the analysis 
and debate on the Tigris-Euphrates conflict in this thesis. 
 
The Euphrates and its tributaries drains a basin of 444 000 km2. 33 % of this lies within 
Turkey, 19 % in Syria and 46 % in Iraq.51  The river is 3000 km long, 41 % runs through 
Turkey, 23 % through Syria and 36 % in Iraq.52 The annual flow of the Euphrates averages 
around 32 billion cubic meters annually.53 The Tigris’ drainage basin is 387 000 km2, of 
which 15 % lies in Turkey, 0,3 % in Syria and 75 % in Iraq.54 The length of the Tigris is 1 850 
km, 22 % in Turkey, 1 % in Syria and 77 % in Iraq.55 At the Shatt al-Arab, the Tigris measures 
an average of 49 billion cubic metres annually.56 
 
The remains of the early civilizations in Mesopotamia were in great part destroyed during 
the Mongolian invasion in the 13th century AD, including the elaborate water management 
constructions. Later, the Ottoman Empire ruled the whole of Mesopotamia, evoking 
conflicts between the Arabs and the Turks. Iraq was founded in 1920, but remained under 
British control until it gained independency in 1932. Syria became a state in 1922, but was 
ruled by French colonial powers until 1946. The period of the Ottoman Empire was 
characterized by Turkish suppression and Arab revolt, but the disputes did not concern the 
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rivers, since these were situated fully within the same empire at the time and were not 
international as today. Although the relationship between the riparians has been marked 
by mistrust and irredentist claims, some attempts of cooperation have been made:  
 
In 1946, Turkey and Iraq concluded the “Treaty of friendship and neighbourly relations”, in 
which they, inter alia, agree to cooperate on observation stations on the Tigris River, and 
that Turkey should allow Iraq to build a dam on Turkish territory. Unfortunately, nothing in 
this treaty has been put into action.57 Turkey and Iraq met in 1963, upon Turkey’s planned 
construction of the Keban Dam, and another meeting took place between Turkey and Syria 
in 1964, where the topic was both the Keban Dam and Syria’s construction of the Tabqa 
Dam. In 1965, the first trilateral meeting took place in Baghdad; the parties exchanged 
technical data regarding their respective dam projects, and discussed the possibility of a 
Joint Technical Committee (JTC). Since the parties failed to agree on the mandate of the 
committee, its foundation was delayed until 1972.58 The committee then met infrequently, 
and was exclusively concerned with technical questions. 
 
The Turkish Keban Dam was finished in 1974 and the Syrian Tabqa Dam in 1975. The JTC 
had not succeeded in obtaining a cooperative agreement on the filling of these reservoirs, 
and both countries finalized their projects individually. In 1980 Turkey announced its 
ambitious water project - The Southern Anatolian project (GAP) - consisting of 22 dams and 
19 power plants on the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. This development called for the 
creation of a permanent JTC the same year. The committee’s mandate was to determine 
the methods and procedures that would help to define the reasonable and appropriate 
amount of water that each country would need from the watercourse59. 
This JTC stranded after sixteen meetings, when its members failed to agree on whether the 
Tigris-Euphrates should bee considered as one or two watercourses, and over the definition 
of international and transboundary rivers. These topics are discussed in chapter 5.2. 
 
During the filling of the Atatürk Dam, the major dam of the GAP, the tree parties concluded 
bilateral agreements. Turkey and Syria agreed in “The Turkish-Syrian Protocol of 1987” that 
Turkey should release a yearly average of 500 m3/s from the Euphrates. Later, Syria and 
Iraq adopted an accord in 1990 dividing the Euphrates water between them. Of the 
Euphrates water flowing into Syria from Turkey, Iraq was to be granted “58 % as a fixed 
annual percentage” and Syria the remaining 42 %.60 These bilateral agreements are the 
subject of discussion in chapter 5.3. 
 
In later years, Syria and Turkey has agreed to cooperate on water related issues such as 
draught and flood management, and water quality and they have approved to the 
construction of a common dam on the Orontes River. 61 No agreement on the rights to and 
allocation of the water of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse has so far been concluded. And 
although small cooperative steps have been taken during the later years, the instable peace 
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situation in the region and the ongoing Turkish constructions on the watercourse makes the 
need for trilateral agreement even greater. 
 
 
After this historic and hydrographic review, the thesis will advance to the two main part of 
the study. Firstly, the determination of the ruling principles of the law of international 
watercourses: 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Applicable International Law 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Throughout the last centuries, different theories of water allocation have been claimed and 
disclaimed by States involved in water conflicts. This chapter will present a theoretical 
analysis of the main theories and the ruling principle of the law of the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses, including the relevant factors for their determination. 
 
The view set forth by US Attorney General Harmon in 1895, defending the state’s sovereign 
power and denying any rights to the co-riparians, is commonly called the theory of absolute 
territorial sovereignty, or the Harmon Doctrine. As McCaffrey describes it, it might have 
been natural in the late 1800 to argue this way, given the undeveloped state of 
international law at that time.62 The theory has historically been claimed by upper riparians 
in several conflicts, and has been broadly debated. Although it has been considered passé 
by both theoreticians and international courts, and has hardly ever been reflected in the 
resolution of actual conflicts, the theory still constructs the basis of Turkey’s policy in 
relation to her co-riparians in the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse.63  In order to analyze 
Turkey’s juridical arguments in chapter 5, it is necessary to examine the core content of the 
theory, and its application in modern international water law. However, as the examination 
will show, the principle has been strongly rejected in international law during the latest 
century, and the survey will therefore not focus as much on the question of its applicability 
as on the reasons for its rejection.  
 
The theory of limited territorial sovereignty, on the other hand, acknowledges a state’s 
right to freedom of action within its own territory, but also obliges the states to act with 
regard to the interests of other riparians. The theory is practiced through the principle of 
equitable utilization of watercourses, which ensures both the equality of the riparian states 
in the basic rights to the watercourse, and the actual allotment of water supply. 
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As a consequence, no riparian can carry out activities that causes disproportional harm to 
other riparian states. Equality of rights is a legal protection, and does not necessarily give 
the watercourse states rights to the same quantity of water, as will be seen in chapter 4.4 
 
At the other end of the scale from absolute sovereignty is the theory of absolute territorial 
integrity, which, in short, obliges riparian states to refrain from any use of the water that 
might possibly affect the use of other riparian states. Although France, in the “Lake 
Lanoux”-case, replaced the amount of diverted water from the lake with an equivalent 
amount from another river, Spain claimed that the man-made diversion in itself 
represented a possible threat to Spanish water supply.64 The Spanish claims are clearly an 
expression of the theory of absolute territorial integrity, and was rejected by the court of 
arbitration.  
 
It is probably not surprising that the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty and the 
theory of absolute territorial integrity frequently have been set forth by riparian states as 
the basis for their argumentation in water disputes. Of course territorial sovereignty is a 
favourite of upper riparians, while territorial integrity is preferred by lower riparians. Both 
theories are based on the consideration of one single watercourse state’s needs and rights, 
and have thus in common that they are somewhat anarchic.65  
 
The fourth theory of water allocation is based on the community of interests, and has roots 
in Roman law. It considers the watercourse as a resource belonging to all the riparian 
states, as a common good. Thus, the watercourse states have a common interest in 
conserving and managing the watercourse in a sustainable and optimal way. This view was 
expressed in the “River Oder”-judgement. The court considered the river as a common 
resource committed to a common management where no state enjoyed a privilege over 
others.66 This view was restated by the International Court of Justice in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros judgement in 1997.  
 
As the absolute integrity, the theory of the community of interests has also met resistance 
and has not, although often debated, been generally practiced during the last decades.  For 
this reason, and for the sake of limitation, these two latter theories will not be part of the 
following survey. 
 
 
The principle of state sovereignty holds a fundamental position in international law; it 
protects independent states from foreign interference in internal affairs, and must be 
respected in order to prevent disintegration. The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty 
and the theory of limited territorial sovereignty are based on different interpretations of 
the principle’s nature and amplitude. To fully understand the two theories and their 
practical implementation, it is necessary to examine their content in relation to the 
principle of territorial sovereignty. The following chapter will first endeavour to determine 
some aspects and problems of the principle of state sovereignty, where a pivotal question 
will be whether the principle of state sovereignty is an absolute right, and if a duty to 
cooperate and to utilize a watercourse in a specific way thus would be a violation of the 
principle. Subsequently follows an examination of the content and sustainment of the 
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theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and of limited territorial sovereignty, based on 
an analysis of treaties, judgements and practices. Since the law of international 
watercourses is a vast subject, the attention in the following chapter is drawn to the 
aspects of international water law that is relevant for the examination in chapter 5. 
 
 
 
4.2 Point of departure: The principle of state sovereignty in 
international law 
 
 
The principle of state sovereignty is one of most fundamental principle of international law, 
and the basis for all international agreements. Every independent state has full sovereignty 
within its own territory; an inherent right to exert power therein, and to exclude other 
states from doing the same. As stated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the “Island 
of Palmas Case”: “Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence”. 67  
 
As seen above, sovereignty was strong in Grotius’ thinking, as he states that a river may be 
occupied by a country, but only the part of the river flowing through its land.68 By this he 
seems to say both that the water existing in the river canal at all times is a part of that 
country’s territory and therefore of its free use, and also that this use is not to be objected 
by other riparians. Thus the principle of sovereignty is understood at its fullest: a regulation 
of one riparian state’s use of the water is a violation of its sovereignty. The question is 
however whether state sovereignty is a rule of international law or whether it is a quality 
that is proportionate to other legal obligations. 
 
In a river basin, the upper and lower riparian have different geographical access to the 
watercourse. From natures side, the balance between the riparians is accordingly different 
since the upper riparian can interfere to a crucial degree with the lower riparian’s access to 
water by diverting or damming the watercourse. For international rivers flowing through 
several states, the flow of the river thus decreases along the river canal. 
To its fullest degree, the principle of state sovereignty gives the independent states the 
right to exploit the natural resources on their territory freely and to their own profit. Such a 
comprehension of the principle would correspond to the theory of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, giving the riparian states the right to use watercourses unrestrictedly, without 
concern of the consequences this may bring to other riparians. Whereas a more progressive 
interpretation of the principle would allow the riparian states to interfere with or object to 
each other’s use of water resources. The question is thereby whether the principle of State 
sovereignty is absolute, or if it has inherent restrictions. 
 
The principle of state sovereignty is expressed in the Charter of the United Nations in article 
2 paragraph 7: “Nothing in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state […]”. 
The principle of sovereignty is thereby a central principle in the laws of the UN. But its 
scope is unclear; if one State’s overuse of a watercourse causes, for instance, draught in a 
neighbour State, the utilization may well be performed within the borders of the upstream 
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state, but the consequences of the overuse are not essentially within the upstream state’s 
jurisdiction. The consequences may not be within its jurisdiction at all, since the performing 
state has all the advantages from such utilization and proportionally few consequences. 
Since a natural resource does not follow the borders and territories of sovereign states, the 
utilization in one state is bound to affect the utilization in other states. This may imply that 
the principle of sovereignty is, although fundamental, not absolute by nature. 
 
According to Steinberger, both treaty obligations and principles of international law “may, 
and frequently do, restrict a State’s freedom of action and thereby the exercise of its 
sovereignty, but they do not diminish or deprive it of its sovereignty as a legal status”.69  
Steinberger here distinguishes between sovereignty as a legal status, and sovereignty as the 
right to exert power within its territory. Accordingly, it is only the latter that might be 
restricted by international obligations. A similar restriction is also expressed in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 193, which accords its member states the 
“sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies 
and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment”.70 The 
sovereignty, as the state’s right to exert power within its territory is here limited in favour 
of its international obligations. Likewise, the preamble of the UN Climate Change 
Convention recalls that States  have […] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.71 In 
these three examples, the extent of the state sovereignty and the freedom to utilize natural 
resources are restricted, especially if such utilization cause harm to other states.  
 
Furthermore, the Permanent Court of International Justice set forth in the “Lotus”-case that 
a state “should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; 
within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.”72 The Court thus 
concludes that sovereignty is a quality that can be restricted by other rules of international 
law, but is not a rule of law itself. This view is supported by Lauterpacht who claims that law 
is a regulation of human conduct and thereby an expression of the limitation of freedom, 
whereas sovereignty is a “quality conferred by international law. It cannot, therefore, be 
either the basis or the source of the law of nations”.73 According to his interpretation, the 
sovereignty of the states is not a legal right regulated by rules of law, but an underlying 
quality. 
 
It is however important to recognize that the principle of state sovereignty has a reciprocal 
nature in regard to the utilization of international watercourses;74 restrictions on the 
utilization in an upstream state limits the actual state’s sovereignty, while unrestricted 
usage in an upstream state limits the sovereignty of the downstream state since the 
potential for water project on its territory will be limited in favour of the upstream state. In 
                                                 
69
 Steinberger, Helmut, “Sovereignty”, in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Bernhardt, R. 
(ed), North-Holland 2000, pages 500-521 (page 512) 
70
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, article 193 
71
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, preamble; see also United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, article 3. 
72
 “The Case of the S.S. Lotus”, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1927, page 19 
73
 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Function of Law in the International Community, Hamden, Connecticut 
1966, page 95-96 
74
 McCaffrey, 2010, page 387 
 23 
this view, the management of international watercourse is in large part a “question of 
reconciling two or more sovereignties.”75 
 
Thus, as the examples above show, the principle of state sovereignty is not a rule of 
international law, and is always submitted to interpretation. The challenge is thereby to 
find the correct balance in each particular case between the principle of state sovereignty 
and the rights deriving from the allocation principles. 
 
 
 
4.3 Historic retrospect: The theory of absolute territorial 
sovereignty 
 
 
4.3.1 Underlying principles 
 
The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is to a large degree based on the principle of 
state sovereignty. Although the theory has not been acknowledged in the international 
community, it still plays a central part in the Tigris-Euphrates conflict. The following chapter 
will therefore present an overview of the main contents of the theory and position in 
international water law. 
 
The infamous opinion of US Attorney General Judson Harmon said that “[t]he fundamental 
principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against others, 
within its own territory… [t]he immediate as well as the possible consequences of the right 
asserted by Mexico show that its recognition is entirely inconsistent with the sovereignty of 
the United States over its national domain”.76  
This is one of the few, but classical, formulations of the principle of full territorial 
sovereignty. Harmon encircles the nation’s sovereignty and territory so firmly that every 
matter with crossing interests becomes its adversary. According to Harmon, a mere 
recognition of Mexico’s rights to the water of the Rio Grande would be inconsistent with 
the United States’ national sovereignty. In his opinion, the territorial sovereignty is absolute 
and without restrictions; each State will have the right to exploit the water flowing in its 
territory, but the theory does not acknowledge that these rights may interfere with another 
state’s utilization of the watercourse. 
 
Neither does the theory take account of the possible damages such a water policy might 
cause to other riparian states. In Harmon’s example, the US as the upper riparian would 
remain rather unharmed by following the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty. But 
Mexico as a lower riparian would have no guarantees for its water supply from the Rio 
Grande, both regarding water quality and water quantity. Since some of the Rio Grande’s 
tributaries rise within Mexican territory, and the lower half of the river forms the border 
between the two states, it might seem fair that Mexico would be entitled to claim some 
rights to the river. But according to the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, these 
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rights would have to be exerted on Mexican territory, without regards to the US’ rights or 
uses. Accordingly, the theory does not balance the total demand for water, and is based 
solely on geographical regards. 
 
Bousek wrote in 1913 that “a state can consume in its entirety and use without restriction 
the waters of all kinds to be found within its territory [and] above all, entirely divert a 
watercourse flowing through its territory or diminish the quantity of water flowing in it”.77 
In Bousek’s view a state is thus in full authority over the water located within its territory at 
all times. By granting the upper riparian the power to divert the river from its original canal, 
and thus deprive lower riparians from a share of the water, Bousek expands the theory of 
absolute territorial sovereignty to its full extent. The theory leaves no room for mitigation 
of damage, or concern for other riparians. Rather, as Bousek continues: “[o]bjections can 
indeed be raised by the lower lying state or by interested persons in that state in the 
negotiations relating to consent in matters of water rights, and the interested persons in 
other states usually come to realise of their own accord that they have no legal claim to 
consideration. Should any such consideration take place, it takes place only in the interests 
of the preservation of good international relations. The decision is however entirely 
unilateral”. Bousek acknowledges that a practice of territorial sovereignty might cause 
harm and rise objections among riparians, but rejects any obligation to cooperate or to 
avoid harm. Any steps in a cooperative direction are voluntarily and motivated by political 
interests. This is a controversial point of view, since it makes the water supply of 
downstream states dependent on political will from the upstream state. The water or the 
rights accorded to downstream states can thereby be considered as a gift from the 
upstream state, putting the upstream state in a favourable light. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, this argument has been part of the polemic in the Tigris-Euphrates conflict. 
 
An example of this is found in the first Rio Grande-treaty of 1906; although the United 
States came to an agreement with Mexico regarding the utilization of the Rio Grande 
without following Harmon’s opinion, the first treaty between them explicitly states that the 
agreement “is not to be construed as a recognition by the United States of any claim on the 
part of Mexico to the said waters” and that the United States did not intend to “concede 
the establishment of any general principle or precedent by the concluding of [the] treaty”.78 
Even tough the United States acknowledges a share of the water to Mexico, and expresses 
her desire “to provide for the equitable distribution of the water of the Rio Grande for 
irrigation purposes”, the  US does not recognize any legal basis for the Mexican claim for 
water. The allotment of water from the Rio Grande is thereby motivated by political will 
and the desire to maintain peaceful neighbourly relations. This harmonizes with Bousek’s 
description of the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty. 
 
Consequently, the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty generally favours upper 
riparians, by giving them the right to administer the river resources unilaterally and to their 
own benefit. But the theory may also protect downstream riparians, for instance in the case 
of the downstream state constructing obstacles to prevent fish from swimming upstream, 
or polluting the river to such a degree that all life is extinct. But in the balance of strength 
between the riparians, according to the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, any 
claims or needs of the weaker riparian are dependent on the mercy of the stronger one.  
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4.3.2 Claims and counterclaims of absolute territorial sovereignty 
 
India claimed the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty towards Pakistan, prior to the 
conclusion of the Indus River Treaty. Soon after the partition in 1947 the government in the 
Indian region of East-Punjab closed the canals supplying water to Pakistan, and claimed that 
the water would not return until the government in the Pakistan region of West-Punjab 
“recognized that it had no rights to the water”.79 The intention of the authorities in Indian 
East-Punjab was to show Pakistan that India, as an upper riparian, had full freedom to 
exploit the water within its own territory, and that Pakistan had no right to interfere or 
complain. The Indian point of view was thus identical to the theory of absolute territorial 
sovereignty. However, the parties reached a solution based on recognition of mutual rights, 
and they divided the different rivers of the watercourse between them. In article 7 
paragraph 1 of the treaty, the parties “recognize that they have a common interest in the 
optimum development of the Rivers [i.e. the complete Indus River basin], and, to that end, 
they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest extent”. By 
admitting a common interest in the basin, the parties recognize each other’s basic rights to 
exploit the water. Accordingly they agree to consider the river and its tributaries as one 
unit, and to co-operate in managing the water allocation in the best manner for both 
parties and the river’s eco-system. 
 
The dispute over the Ganges River rose after India built the Farakka barrage on the river 
between 1961 and 1975. The conveyance created a problem for Bangladesh, especially in 
the dry season, and the country brought the matter to the United Nations General 
Assembly. In reply of Bangladeshi complaints, India claimed that the Ganges was not an 
international river because 99 % of its catchment area lay within the Indian borders. And 
since the river was not international, Bangladesh had no reason to claim any basic rights. 
This argument slightly differs from the position India took in the Indus-dispute, since she in 
the present case acknowledges Bangladesh’s rights to utilization provided that the river is in 
fact international. After discussions in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly and dialogue between the countries, India accepted the international 
status of the Ganges River and the parties reached an agreement. In fact India insisted that 
her views “did not conform to the Harmon doctrine of absolute sovereignty of a riparian 
State over the waters within its territory, as has been implied in the statement by the 
representative of Bangladesh”.80 As McCaffrey notes – the Harmon Doctrine may become 
an effective weapon for a downstream state accusing an upper riparian of unreasonable 
utilization.81 The theory of absolute sovereignty was thus rejected by the parties also here, 
and the solution was based on equality. 
 
In the “Lake Lanoux”-arbitration between Spain and France, the main question was 
whether the diversion of the Carol River on French territory was a breach of the agreement 
between the parties. France intended to replace the diverted water with water from 
another watercourse, but Spain claimed that such practice violated the agreement, and 
could present a risk to the Spanish water supply. In her arguments, France did not explicitly 
claim the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, but argued that “[t]he sovereignty of 
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each of the two States on its own territory remains untouched, subject only to the 
restrictions contained in international instruments in force between them”.82 France hereby 
recognizes that the agreements between the parties restricts the territorial sovereignty, but 
implies at the same time that full sovereignty is the main principle and that restrictions on 
this sovereignty cannot come from international custom or principles of international law, 
but only from agreements the parties are explicitly part of. France’s argument thus has 
elements from the Harmon Doctrine, but acknowledges at the same time that the 
territorial sovereignty might have restrictions.  
 
In its judgement of the Lake Lanoux conflict, the court of arbitration stated that 
“[t]erritorial sovereignty plays the part of a presumption. It must bend before all 
international obligations, whatever their origin, but only before such obligations”. The court 
found that states had a duty to cooperate and seek agreements concerning the 
management of transboundary rivers, and that this obligation thus came prior to the 
territorial sovereignty. The judgement from the court of arbitration thereby indicates that 
the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty was not a governing principle of international 
law. 
 
Similarly, William L. Griffin concluded several decades ago that the great majority of 
publicist on the subject of international water law “come to the conclusion that the essence 
of international law upon the matter is the principle of mutual rights and obligations 
between co-riparians in their uses of waters of international basins, and, in the event of 
competing uses, equitable apportionment of the waters or of their benefits”.83 He further 
claims that “riparians possess the right of exclusive jurisdiction and control over the part of 
a system of international waters in their territory, and these rights reciprocally restrict the 
freedom of action of the others”.84 Acknowledgement of mutual rights and restrictions is 
not in harmony with the unrestricted and unilateral utilization deriving from the Harmon 
Doctrine. This may indicate that applicable international law had left the doctrine of 
Harmon already in 1959. 
 
Throughout the latest century few, if any, treaties or international judgements have been 
based on the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty.85 Not even in contracts from its 
country of origin, is the Harmon Doctrine a leading principle. As McCaffrey observes, the 
theory of absolute territorial sovereignty might have seemed natural in the late 19th 
century, due to the undeveloped state of law at the time. The Harmon Doctrine can hence 
be seen as a precautionary step in an unsettled juridical landscape, in order to prevent 
unnecessary acknowledgement of rights. McCaffrey declares the theory at present as “an 
anachronism that has no place in today’s interdependent, water-scarce world”.86 
 
As these examples show, the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty has not been 
practiced in recent times, and has not enjoyed international recognition. The absolute 
territorial sovereignty is thereby not expression of customary international law. 
This chapter has shown that the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty grants more 
importance to territorial rights than what is accepted in the modern world of international 
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commitment. The ideals behind the theory is the protection of the autonomy and 
independency of the sovereign state, while the contemporary approach, as follows in the 
next subchapter, emphasizes cooperation and common responsibility. 
 
 
 
4.4 The principle of equitable utilization 
 
The second theory to examine is the theory of limited territorial sovereignty, which is 
practiced through the principle of equitable utilization. As this principle is generally 
recognized as the ruling principle of international watercourses, it is more natural to 
establish its status before exploring its contents. In light of the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi 
arguments in chapter 5, the following chapter will determine both whether equitable 
utilization is a principle of customary international law, and thus binding upon all states; 
and also to determine the general contents of the principle. 
 
The principle of equitable utilization is a concept for the allocation of water in international 
watercourses, based on the rights and interests of all the watercourse states, and with a 
clear focus on the sustainable and optimal utilization of the watercourse. The principle thus 
has two main aspects; firstly, it confirms the equality of the riparian states by according 
each state a basic right to utilize the watercourse. Secondly, it sets standards for the actual 
allocation of water. Even if the watercourse states are all granted a basic right to the water, 
this is not to say that they are all entitled to an equal amount of water. The evaluation of 
equitable utilization is unique to each watercourse, and depends on a number of individual 
factors. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Equitable Utilization as customary international law  
 
In order to be a principle of customary international law, equitable utilization must firstly 
be subject to a “general practice” for the water distribution in international watercourses, 
and secondly, this practice must be “accepted as law”, according to article 38 of the ICJ-
status.87  
 
The first question is accordingly whether equitable utilization of an international 
watercourse is a “general practice” in the international community. 
 
The International Court of Justice stated in the “North Sea Continental Shelf”-cases that a 
certain practice could become a general rule in a relatively short period of time, since “a 
very widespread and representative participation [in the practice] might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of the States whose interests were specially affected.”88 The Court 
implies that time is a factor in the determination, but also accords great importance to the 
extent of practice and practicing states. In order to be a “general practice”, the principle 
must thus be widely practiced, especially between states that are affected by conflicts over 
international watercourses.  
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The principle of equitable utilization is a fundamental principle of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The Convention’s article 5 
declares that watercourse states “shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner”. In the commentaries to the 
convention, the International Law Commission characterizes the “well-established rule of 
equitable utilization” as one of “the fundamental rights and duties of States with regard to 
the utilization of international watercourses”.89 The commission thus considers the 
principle to be customary law. Additionally, the mandate given to the ILC from the UN 
General Assembly was to “take up the study of the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses with a view to its progressive development and codification”.90 
One of the Convention’s principal objectives is thus to codify already existing customary 
principles of international water law, based on a study of case law. A great majority of 
states voted in favour of the convention during the General Assembly voting. The 
Convention’s great influence as a text of UN consensus contributes to the conception and 
practice of the principle of equitable utilization. 
 
When the United States and Mexico concluded their first treaty over the Rio Grande in 
1906, they expressed a desire to “provide for the equitable distribution of the waters of the 
Rio Grande for irrigation purposes”.91 Despite the doctrine of Attorney General Harmon 
prior to the agreement, the spirit of the negotiations was equitability. This is also reflected 
in the title of the convention: “Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande”. The 
principle of equitable use was thus present in international agreements at the beginning of 
the 20th century.  
 
In the Mahakali River-treaty between India and Nepal, the parties express in the preamble 
“the desirability to enter into a treaty on the basis of equal partnership to define their 
obligations and corresponding rights and duties thereto in regard to the waters of the 
Mahakali River and its utilization”. A treaty on the basis of “equal partnership” confirms the 
equality between the parties in their basic right to the watercourse, but cannot be 
interpreted as a quantitative standard. Likewise in the treaty of the Ganges River, India and 
Bangladesh agrees on finding “a fair and just solution”.92 Although the parties do not use 
the expression ‘equitable utilization’, the willingness to find a fair solution is a step in the 
same direction. The desire from the preamble is strengthened in article 2 paragraph 3, 
which states that adjustments in the distribution of water in case of extreme scarcity, shall 
be done “in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party”. 
When the parties also agree in article 9 to base future water sharing treaties on the 
“principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party”, the principle of equity is central 
in their accord.  The treaty is thereby an expression of state practice in favour of the 
principle of equity. 
 
The “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project” was a planned dam project on the Danube River, 
contrived in cooperation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, later Slovakia. The works 
started in 1978, but due to massive debate and criticism towards the project’s 
environmental impact, Hungary decided to suspend the works at Nagymaros in may 1989. 
                                                 
89
 ILC Yearbook 1994 volume II part two, page 96-97. 
90
 UN General Assembly Resolution 2669 (XXV), 8. December 1970. 
91
 Convention between the United States and Mexico, Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio 
Grande, 1906, preamble. 
92
 Ganges River Treaty, preamble 
 29 
In October the same year Hungarian authorities decided to completely abandon the 
project. Slovakia continued its part of the project unilaterally, but chose another method of 
damming to be able to make the project work on her side of the border. The unilateral 
damming of the Danube caused serious problems for Hungary, and threatened her water 
supply. In its judgement, the Court stated that Hungary’s withdrawal from the common 
project could not “mean that Hungary forfeited its basic right to an equitable and 
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse”.93 Further the Court 
found that Czechoslovakia had deprived Hungary of “its right to an equitable and 
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube [… and thereby] failed to respect 
the proportionality which is required by international law”.94 The Court thus declares that 
the principle of equitable utilization is a fundamental right of all riparian states, and that a 
state cannot eliminate or decrease this right on other riparian’s behalf. And further, that 
this balance between the riparian states represents a proportionality which is “required by 
international law”. The International Court of Justice consequently establishes the principle 
of equitable utilization as a ruling principle, and demonstrates that neglect of this principle 
constitutes a breach of the applicable international law. According to the ICJ, the principle 
is both a “general practice” and “accepted as law”. 
 
The principle of equitable utilization is frequently employed as a foundation for agreements 
on the utilization of international watercourses. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
states in its preamble that a legal order of the seas will promote, inter alia, “the equitable 
and efficient utilization of their resources”. 95 Among the objectives of the UN Convention 
on Biological Diversity is “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources.”96 The principle is consistent in international environmental 
law and law concerning natural resources. Being employed as a core principle in several 
environmental conventions, it creates a standard for the administration of all nature’s 
resources. The regards to the continuity of the environmental laws thus weighs in favour of 
considering the principle as customary international law. 
 
Consequently, it seems clear that the principle of equitable utilization is a “general 
practice” in the international community.  
 
 
 
The decisive issue is subsequently whether the principle of equitable utilization is “accepted 
as law” in accordance with art 38 paragraph 1 litra b of the ICJ statute. 
 
As seen in chapter 2.3, opinio juris is a belief that the act in question is required by law.  
According to Akehurst, state practice must be “accompanied by (or consist of) statements 
that certain conduct is permitted, required or forbidden by international law”.97 As it is 
difficult to prove that states genuinely believe a practice to be required by law before it can 
become law, a natural approach is to focus on the statements set forth by the states in 
connection to the practice. When a state claims that equitable utilization is a principle of 
customary international law, the pivotal factor, in Akehurst’s view, is not necessarily 
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whether this state believes its claim to be true or not, but whether it is challenged by other 
states.98 
 
Cassese claims that State practice in its early stages will be “regarded as being imposed by 
social or economic or political needs (opinio necessitatis)”, and if “it does not encounter 
strong and consistent opposition from other States but is increasingly accepted, or 
acquiesced in, a customary rule gradually crystallizes”.99 Hence, Cassese also supports the 
view that lack of protest against a statement of customary law is sufficient to manifest 
opinio juris. 100 
 
As seen earlier, the UNWC was intended to codify important principles of international law 
concerning the non-navigational usage of international watercourses, inter alia the 
principle of equitable utilization. As the principle was almost unanimously adopted as 
applicable international law in the UN General Assembly, and received only three contra 
votes, the protests against the principle have neither been broad nor substantial. On the 
contrary, the consensus towards the convention and the principle of equitable utilization is 
so broad and consistent that the three protesting votes hardly can be given any 
importance. The voting record concerning the UNWC is thereby an expression of opinio 
juris concerning the principle of equitable utilization. 
 
The principle is also one of the core principles in international environmental law, 
constituting a unifying foundation for the law of natural resources, development and 
environmental protection, which shows its integrity and accept in the international 
community.101  
 
Another significant proof of opinio juris is the “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project”-judgement, 
where action inconsistent with the principle of equitable utilization entails consequences. 
The Court stated first that “[m]odern development of international law [had] strengthened 
this principle [of equitable utilization] for international watercourses”, and since Slovakia’s 
diversion of the Danube was inequitable, the Court found it unlawful. The principle of 
equitable utilization is thus presented as a binding rule of international law, and the 
judgement is an expression of opinio juris in favour of the principle. 
 
Conclusively, based on these factors, the principle of equitable utilization is “accepted as 
law” in accordance with art 38 paragraph 1 litra b of the ICJ statute. 
 
The principle of equitable utilization is thus “general practice accepted as law”, and thereby 
an applicable principle of international law, binding upon all members of the international 
community. 
 
Having established the applicability of this principle, it is time to examine its contents: 
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4.4.2 Determining equitability 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Introduction 
 
The literal meaning of “equitable” is ‘fair’, ‘impartial’ or ‘reasonable’, and the expression 
can describe a system where none of its participants are treated differently from others. 
The principle entails both the basic right to a watercourse and the actual allotment of the 
water resources. Similarly, the principle also addresses the sustainable and optimal 
development of the watercourse, and therefore requires cooperation amongst the involved 
parties.  
Equitable utilization should therefore be interpreted as a concept where all relevant 
aspects influence each other, and where the correct balance between them will vary from 
conflict to conflict. The principle embodies both an obligation and a right; it reflects the 
principle of sovereignty in the sense that a state has the right to an equitable use of a 
watercourse within its own territory, and correlatively it poses an obligation on the states 
to use the watercourse in such a way that it does not affect other watercourse state’s 
equitable use of the same watercourse. 102 
 
The Laws of Hammurabi can serve as an example here. In § 53 is stated that anyone holding a 
piece of land in an area where a canal flows “is bound to keep ‘his dyke’ or ‘bank’ … namely that 
part of it adjoining his plot, in proper repair and, if a breach is made in it by the water through 
his neglect and the area is flooded, he must replace the corn thereby destroyed”.
103
 This is not 
an expression of the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, since it encourages farmers to 
avoid causing harm upon others, and obliges them to compensate any eventual damage. Neither 
is it typical of the theory of absolute territorial integrity, since it allows farmers to construct 
water diverting instruments on their territory, even if they might increase the risk for damage on 
other’s property. As the rule in Hammurabi’s law allows possible harm-causing activity, but 
obliges recompense for eventual damage, it clearly considers the riparians as sovereign and 
equal, and must therefore be seen as an expression of the theory of limited territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
However, the principle of equitable utilization only protects a watercourse state against 
legal harm from other watercourse states. The protection against factual harm is codified in 
the UNWC article 7, through the obligation not to cause harm to other watercourse states. 
The legal protection provided by the principle of equitable utilization prohibits a 
watercourse state to use the watercourse in a manner that limits or hinders the possible 
use of other watercourses in any unreasonable manner. The utilization of a watercourse 
will thus not be equitable, if it obstructs another watercourse state’s rightful use of the 
watercourse. The legal right to utilize a watercourse is a proportional right, whose extent 
depends on the factual situation, protected through the principle of equitable utilization 
and which can not be infringed without the acceptance of other watercourse states. 
 
The UNWC article 6 contains a list of factors to consider in the determination of 
equitability. The list is naturally non-exhaustive, since the evaluation of equity “requires 
taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances”.104 Other contributing 
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components to the analysis can be found in bilateral treaties and case law. By comparing 
and analyzing these factors, general guidelines for equity appear.  
 
The principle has surely been criticized of being too vague and abstract. Hélène Ruiz-Fabri 
claims that although the principle may be well established as a customary principle of 
international law, it does not provide any immediately applicable rule concerning the 
watercourse states’ quantitative or qualitative right to water.105 In her opinion, the uniform 
procedures will give a variety of results since the rule may only be mediately applicable and 
must be interpreted in each individual case. This point of view is of course true, but is such 
a procedure necessarily negative? Formulation of general and precise rules for water 
allocation would be difficult, because of the natural and circumstantial varieties for each 
watercourse, but such concrete rules could also easily be inequitable, due to these same 
differences. Even if the final result is different in each watercourse, it is not necessarily 
unreasonable. Bearing in mind that the result should reflect the individual situation of a 
watercourse, and that equitable utilization is a dynamic process the results will inevitably 
differ, but this does not necessarily make them inequitable.106 
 
In the following examination of the contents of the principle of equitable utilization, it is 
convenient to arrange the factors of equitability into four general categories, bearing in 
mind that they are each mutually equal; distribution, optimal use, environmental 
protection and cooperation. All categories contain factors that give directions to the final 
result. The equitable utilization of the watercourse and therein the actual allotment 
between the riparian states is thus concluded by balancing the separate factors and 
categories in a holistic evaluation. 
 
 
 
4.4.2.2 Factors concerning distribution 
 
The first category of factors contains elements connected to the present and future 
utilization of the watercourse. The states’ demand for water and their degree of 
dependency can vary considerably between countries in the same region, on account of the 
differences in population, climate, the extent of industry and agriculture, and a variety of 
other reasons. Factors representing demand and actual use are listed in the UNWC’s article 
6 litra b – “[t]he social and economic needs for the watercourse States concerned” and in 
litra d – “[t]he population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State”. 
Water demand and dependency also interacts with the degree of development in the states 
in question – states with poor economy and incomplete water supply to private households 
may use less water than states with a strong economy and water consuming inhabitants. 
Contrariwise, the technology in well developed countries may be more advanced, so that 
the efficiency of water exploitation is better, and less water is needed. These are typical 
considerations to make regarding the equity of the water distribution. 
 
Existing uses and potential uses also belongs to this category of distribution. An essential 
point here is that these two factors are listed together in article 6 litra e of the UNWC, 
“[e]xisting and potential uses of the watercourse”. With this formulation the ILC renounces 
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any priority between them.107  Planned uses of the watercourse thus have the same weight 
as existing uses in the determination of equitability. Neither the convention nor the ILC’s 
commentary defines what is meant by “potential uses”. It does not seem to be a condition 
that the “potential” use should be concrete or imminent. A state’s economic stability and 
the need for water will gradually change over time, but sometimes alterations happen 
quickly. To offer an ensured protection of potential uses, the expression should be 
interpreted widely. The protection of potential uses must include the protection of a state’s 
present and future legal right to utilize the watercourse. One watercourse state cannot 
rightly consume the entire resource solely for the reason that the other watercourse states 
are not taking use of their right. To be ensured protection, a potential use of a watercourse 
must therefore be equitable in relation to both existing uses and other potential uses. This 
might be better illustrated through the following practical examples: 
 
Many watercourses have been used exclusively by the lower riparians for decades, and 
conflicts have arisen when an upper riparian have claimed a right to utilize the watercourse. 
108 This is the case for the Nile, where Egypt and Sudan has irrigated and utilized the water 
for several millennia, while upper riparians, as Ethiopia and Uganda, only lately have 
started to manage the water of the Nile and to claim their legal share of the river 
resources.109 An equitable use of the Nile, must therefore take into account the already 
existing uses by Egypt and Sudan. At the same time, the Egyptian and Sudanese utilisation 
of the Nile, must not exclude the equitable utilisation or, in this case, the possible future 
utilisation of the other watercourse states. 
 
In the “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project”-judgement, the ICJ found that Slovakia’s unilateral 
project on the Danube River was a breach of international law. The court cited The 
Permanent Court of Justice’s judgement in the case of the River Oder (1929) in saying that 
the interests of riparian states to a navigable river is “a common legal right, the essential 
features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole 
course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State 
in relation to the others”. The Court hereby underlines the equality between existing and 
potential uses and at the same time states the equality between the riparian States. 
The International Law Association adopted a resolution at its New York conference in 1958, 
where one of the agreed principles of international law was that “[c]o-riparian states are 
under a duty to respect the legal rights of each co-riparian state in the drainage basin”.110 
The legal rights of the co-riparians refer to the basic rights deriving from international law, 
and particularly the right to an equitable share of a watercourse. The citation from the 
International Law Association thus means that each riparian state must develop and 
consume the watercourse within its territory in such a manner as not to reduce other 
riparian’s access to the same. The degree of both established and potential uses must 
therefore adjust according to the volume of the watercourse, and the amount of water 
equitably distributed to each watercourse. 
Steven McCaffrey concludes that “[n]ew upstream uses may be permissible even where 
existing downstream uses fully consume the stream’s water” and that this “may be the 
case, for example, where the benefits of a new use […] substantially outweigh the harm 
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that might result from it”.111  This corresponds with the ILA’s statement above, since a full 
consummation of the watercourse from a single state, clearly will be a violation of the legal 
rights of the other states. 
 
 
 
4.4.2.3 Factors concerning the optimal use 
 
This second category of factors is devoted to the method of utilization.  
One of the aims of the UNWC is that “an international watercourse shall be used and 
developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable 
utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the 
watercourse States concerned”.112 Article 5 thus instructs the watercourse states to pursue 
an optimal use of the watercourse. The optimal utilization will accordingly mean the ways 
of usage that gives the best benefit while causing the least harm. The determination of 
optimal use has two main aspects; the effectiveness of the actual allocation, and the 
technical adequacy of the utilization. 
 
The category of optimal use contains factors for evaluating the character of the utilization, 
both the existing and the potential ones. In cases where the consumption of a watercourse 
is inauspicious or inefficient, the utilisation of the watercourse may also be inequitable, 
since the consuming state could reduce its utilization by improving its water management 
system, and thereby increase the amount of water available to the other states. The 
evaluation of the optimal use of the watercourse is therefore mainly a question of 
alternatives. If usage A is the sole possibility to use the watercourse for purpose B, and 
usage A is not harmful to the existing or legal rights of other riparians or to the 
watercourse’s ecosystem, there may be no reason to claim that usage A is inequitable. But 
the existence of alternative methods or uses C and D gives reason to question the efficiency 
of the different methods in order to find the most favourable one. This is also stated in the 
UN Convention article 6 litra g: “[t]he availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a 
particular planned or existing use”. The request for alternatives is thereby connected to the 
actual utilization of the watercourse, and not to the availability of other water resources. 
The latter was proposed by Egypt as a factor for determining equity, but was declined by 
the ILC’s working group.113  
 
Similarly, it is necessary to evaluate the technology of water exploitation. Water is an 
increasingly scarce resource, and it is crucial that the water is used as efficiently as possible. 
Modern technology can provide systems for irrigation and other types of water exploitation 
that reduces the amount of water extracted from the watercourse without harming the 
purpose of the utilization. States that employ outdated technology might use excessive 
amounts of water compared to states with more current methods. In order to be equitable, 
the utilization must be as efficient as possible in the actual circumstances. Hence, the 
principle of equitable utilization obliges the watercourse states to achieve the highest 
qualitative utilization of the resources with the lowest quantitative pressure. 
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4.4.2.4 Environmental factors 
 
Natural and environmental issues constitute the largest category of factors for the 
evaluation of equitable utilization. It embodies geography, hydrography, hydrology and 
other natural and environmental factors. Since every watercourse is unique, and the states 
through which it runs all have different physical attachments to it, these factors are also to 
be considered individually for each watercourse. 
The environmental focus is emphasized in recent judgements on the field of international 
water law. In the advisory opinion on the “Legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons”, the ICJ stated that “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment”.114 This view is also acknowledged in the more recent “Case Concerning 
Pipe Mills on the River Uruguay” between Argentina and Uruguay.115 
 
The UNWC article 20 obliges the states to “protect and preserve the ecosystems of 
international watercourses”. In its commentary, the ILC defines “ecosystem” as an 
“ecological unit consisting of living and non-living components that are interdependent and 
function as a community”.116 Thus the term “ecosystem” is more precise than the term 
‘environment’, and embodies factors both outside of and within the watercourse.  
The ILC underlines in its commentary to UNWC article 20, that the duty to protect the 
ecosystem is “a specific application of the requirement contained in article 5 [equitable 
utilisation]”.117 Environmental concerns are hence an international obligation, and thereby 
a central factor in the estimation of equitable utilization of watercourses. 
 
The concept of sustainable use was invented by the Brundtland Commission in 1987, 
essentially meaning “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”118 The concept is 
now an integrated part of the principle of equitable utilization, through the wording of the 
UNWC article 5. 
 
In the determination of the equitable utilization and the evaluation of its factors, the river’s 
ecosystem itself should be considered an independent party. For instance, states A and B 
agrees on a manner of utilizing the watercourse giving each state an equitable share vis à 
vis the other state, but which harms the watercourse by polluting it or causing serious and 
sustainable drought. Even if such utilization may be equitable between the states, it is not 
equitable towards the watercourse’s natural environment, which ends up paying a very 
high price. The increasing focus on sustainability and environmental protection accentuates 
the role of the ecosystem in the distribution and conservation of water resources between 
states.  
 
Although this ecological factor has been given increasing importance in the last decades, it 
is seldom mentioned in elder treaties. The Mahakali Treaty obliges India to maintain a 
certain minimum flow downstream from the Sarada Barrage, in order “to maintain and 
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preserve the river eco-system”. Since the original flow of the river has been interrupted by 
the barrage, India must maintain a minimum flow to prevent a deterioration of the river 
climate. 
 
In the Indus Treaty, the parties agreed in article IV paragraph II that “any Non-Consumptive 
Use made by [either of the Parties] shall be so made as not to materially change, on 
account of such use, the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the other uses on that 
channel by the other Party under the provisions of this Treaty”.  Similarly, the Ganges 
Treaty states in its preamble that one of its aims is to “make the optimum utilisation of the 
water […] in the fields of flood management”. Since the Ganges River is vulnerable to 
floods, this is a cardinal concern for both parties. By cooperating in controlling the flow of 
the river, the parties capacitate the equitable utilization of the river; keeping in mind that 
flood would cause both factual and legal harm to the involved parties. It is thus clear that 
any activity from one of the parties causing additional flood, would be inequitable. In such a 
case, the flood control is a prerequisite for an equitable distribution of the watercourse. 
 
The geography of the watercourse and the watercourse states, may also contribute to the 
evaluation of equity. A transboundary watercourse is hardly ever positioned equally within 
the territory of each watercourse state.  If there are considerable geographic differences, 
these might be reflected in the actual allotment of water rights. This is also the case for 
hydrological factors, such as contribution and water flow. 
Adding contribution as a factor for evaluation of equity in article 6 was proposed to the ILC 
working group by India, but ultimately declined. However the ILC states in its commentary 
that “contribution to the watercourse by each watercourse state” is amongst the 
“hydrological” factors in the evaluation of equity.119  The “hydrographic” factors relate 
more to the properties of the watercourse, its description, mapping and measurement.120 
 
 
 
4.4.2.5 Factors concerning cooperation 
 
The fourth category of factors addresses the collaboration between the watercourse states 
in the management of the watercourse. 
Inherent in the principle of equitable utilization lays a duty to cooperate and to agree on 
equitable solutions. The arbitral court stated in the Lake Lanoux-case that “[a] State wishing 
to do that which will affect an international watercourse cannot decide whether another 
State’s interests will be affected; the other State is the sole judge of that and has the right 
to information on the proposals”.121 The watercourse states are not the best judges of their 
individual utilization, and are dependent on each other for a holistic determination. 
 
In order to obtain an optimal, sustainable and equitable utilization of the watercourse as a 
whole, the riparian states must cooperate in its development and conservation. This is also 
codified in the UNWC art 8 paragraph 1, stating that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate 
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in 
order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international 
watercourse”. Thus, the objective of the cooperation seems to be the achievement of 
“optimal utilization and adequate protection” of the watercourse. This aim is explicitly 
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mentioned in the Indus River Treaty’s article VII, where India and Pakistan “recognize that 
they have a common interest in the optimum development of the Rivers, and, to that end, 
they declare their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible 
extent”. The parties thereby link the “optimum development” of the river to the 
cooperation between them. 
 
Brazil, Argentine, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of the River Plate Basin 
in 1969, with the intention to “establish firmer institutional arrangement for the River Plate 
Basin”.122 The parties are convinced that “joint action will permit the harmonious and 
balanced development and optimum utilization of the principal natural resources of the 
region and will ensure the conservation of those resources for future generations if they 
are utilized rationally”.123 Also here, the cooperation is presented as an instrument 
permitting optimal utilization and conservation of the watercourse. 
 
In the Mahakali Treaty, the parties agree to cooperate in the Pancheshwar Multipurpose 
Project, prepared by both parties and designed to “produce the maximum total net 
benefit”.124 By cooperating and sharing the power stations on each side of the border, India 
and Nepal cooperates in exploiting the resources in the most optional manner. 
As the above-mentioned treaties show, cooperation is essential for the optimal use and 
protection of the watercourse, and thus also a central part of the principle of equitable 
utilization. 
 
The means of cooperation may be divided in two main categories; communication and joint 
commissions. As for the communication, many international water treaties contain an 
obligation to exchange information. This could be factual data regarding both the 
observation of water quality and quantity, or political information about planned projects 
in the watercourse. However, as stated in the Lake Lanoux-case, consensus between 
watercourse states is not necessarily a stipulation for commencing unilateral projects on 
the watercourse.125 An upper riparian is thus not automatically obliged to seek the approval 
of the lower riparians before launching a water management project. Still it remains certain 
that agreement and exchange of information are the most efficient ways to avoid conflicts 
and to utilize the watercourse equitably.  
The UNWC codifies both these types of information exchange. Article 9 obliges the states to 
exchange data on a regular basis, especially that of “hydrological, meteorological, 
hydrogeological and ecological nature”. And in article 11, the parties are obliged to 
“exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the possible 
effects of planned measures on the condition of an international watercourse”. The article 
expresses a general obligation to communicate, and also to evaluate possible impact on 
other riparian states. 
 
In the Rhine Treaty, the parties agree in article 5 to “step up their cooperation and to 
inform one another, particularly regarding actions taken in their territory to protect the 
Rhine”.126 Likewise, the Indus Treaty presents in its article VI, a list of “data with respect to 
the flow in, and utilization of the waters of, the Rivers [to be] exchanged regularly between 
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the Parties”.127 The exchange of information will both guide the watercourse states to a 
more efficient utilization of the watercourse, but also prevent conflict between them. 
 
 
The second main factor of cooperation is the establishment of a joint watercourse 
committee. A joint committee consists of representatives from all the watercourse states in 
different scientific fields, and has consultative power. The joint committee’s mandate is 
decided by the riparian states, and usually codified in a treaty. 
 
The Mahakali Treaty’s article 9 initiates the organization of the Mahakali River Commission, 
whose functions are, inter alia, to seek information on the structures of the treaty and to 
make recommendations to the parties about necessary measures, to “provide expert 
evaluation of projects”, to “co-ordinate and monitor plans of actions arising out of the 
implementation of [the treaty]”, and to “examine any differences arising between the 
parties concerning the interpretation and application of [the treaty]”.128 The commission is 
thus an independent and competent organ that guides the watercourse states towards the 
optimal utilization of the watercourse and the preservation and protection of the 
ecosystem. 
 
Similar joint commissions can be found in a great number of other international 
watercourse treaties.  The joint commission of the Ganges Treaty was created in order to 
observe and record flow data from certain points along the river, and also to implement the 
arrangements from the treaty.129 Similarly, the Indus Treaty founds the Permanent Indus 
Commission, whose general function is to “establish and maintain co-operative 
arrangements for the implementation of [the Indus] Treaty [and] to promote co-operation 
between the Parties in the development of the waters of the River”. 130 
Between Mexico and the United States, an International Boundary Commission was 
established already in 1899, with a mandate to facilitate the realisation of earlier treaties.131 
The commission was retained in the 1944-treaty, and was given the status of an 
international body, whose duty was to “make provisions for the joint use of international 
waters” on uses specified in the treaty. A similar commission has also been constituted 
between the US and Canada, to observe and manage all of their boundary waters, and to 
resolute watercourse-related disputes.132 
Also the Agreement on the Mekong River basin and the Treaty of the River Plate basin 
addresses the responsibility of a joint commission.133  
 
 
 
4.4.2.6 Brief summary 
 
To summarize, the principle of equitable utilization constitutes a great number of factors, 
here arranged into four categories. The categories and the factors are interrelated and no 
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factor enjoys priority over another. For instance, the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse is unique 
with its own geographical and hydrological characteristics, and its riparians also have 
different needs and patterns of utilization.  Evaluating equity is therefore a holistic process, 
and the following analysis must take into account the features of the Tigris-Euphrates and 
its relation to its watercourse states. 
 
 
Having established the status of the principle of equitable utilization as a ruling principle of 
customary international law, and explored the factors for its determination, it is time to 
employ these findings in the examination of the situation in the Tigris-Euphrates basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The legal arguments of the parties in the Tigris-
Euphrates conflict in comparison with applicable 
international law 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
In spite of decades of discontinuous negotiation, Turkey, Syria and Iraq have not reached a 
permanent agreement concerning the utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse.  
The three riparian states have had adversary opinions on several aspects of the 
watercourse and its utilization, amongst them the character of the watercourse, and the 
rights to exploit its water. Iraq, having hosted the ancient civilizations where irrigation and 
damming of water first was invented, has claimed historic rights to the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse. Iraq is the lower riparian of both the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, and being 
in this vulnerable position, she is anxious to secure her water supply. 
Syria is both upper and lower riparian on both rivers, and although her geographical share 
of the Tigris river is minor, she is nevertheless in a different position than Iraq. Syria is also 
the one state contributing the least to the flow of the twin rivers, and at the same time 
largely dependent on its water. Since Syria has few tributary rivers to the Euphrates and 
none to the Tigris, receiving a steady water flow from Turkey is crucial. 
As the upper riparian of both the rivers, Turkey is in the most favourable position to utilize 
the watercourse. For a long time, Turkey pleaded the theory of absolute territorial 
sovereignty, by claiming that the rivers were of free use to her, since they rose within 
Turkish territory. Protected by this argument, Turkey has launched an ambitious and 
expensive dam project in Southeastern Anatolia (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, hereafter 
GAP) containing the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydraulic power plants on the Tigris-
Euphrates watercourse. The project will irrigate 1,7 million hectares of land, and cost as 
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much as 32 billion US $.134 The first dam in the project, the Ataturk Dam, was opened in 
1992 and the completion of the remaining parts of the project has several times been 
postponed due to lack of funding. The dams are planned on both rivers, but since the Tigris 
receives large amounts of water from tributaries on Iraqi territory, the Euphrates will suffer 
the greatest loss of flow. According to some scholars, the GAP will reduce the Euphrates’ 
flow into Syria with 40 % and into Iraq with 90 %.135 Although the present thesis does not 
have the capacity to discuss the equity of the GAP-project per se, it is important to bear in 
mind its possible consequences for the downstream riparians to the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse, and that these prospects generates much of the tension amongst the three 
watercourse states. 
 
Nevertheless, the three riparians have, during recent years, managed to cooperate on 
certain issues related to water management. Turkey and Iraq established their High 
Strategic Cooperation Council in 2008, and the council had its first meeting in September 
2009. The parties have agreed to cooperate in the fields of politics, economy, energy, 
water, culture and security.136 A similar council has also been established between Turkey 
and Syria. Turkey and Iraq have signed a Memorandum of Understanding, where they agree 
to exchange hydrological and meteorological information and expertise in these fields.137 
And Turkey and Syria have signed different Memorandums of Understanding concerning 
the construction of a common dam on the Orontes River, the construction of a Syrian 
pumping station on the Tigris River, and efficient water utilization in general.138139 This last 
Memorandum sets up general rules and guidelines for exchange of information, joint 
studies and cooperation on draught management.140 In addition to these agreements, a 
Joint Technical Committee has been reconvened and has had yearly meetings since 2007.  
Accordingly, a will to cooperate has evolved during the latest years. But even though the 
ongoing common projects are related to water efficiency and draught control, none are 
directly related to the question of rights to and allocation of the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse. Therefore, in the lack of an overall management structure, the potential for 
conflict and need for applicable legal rules remain present. 
 
In the present chapter, the legal arguments of the three parties will be analyzed and 
compared to the applicable international law. But it must be made clear that due to the 
unstable circumstances in the region and the reserved public communication from some of 
the parties, it has been difficult to keep totally updated on the factual situation. 
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Consequently, some of the legal arguments discussed below, may have been withdrawn 
from the actual debate. Nevertheless, these arguments play an interesting part in the 
analysis and development of the legal situation in the Tigris-Euphrates conflict. 
 
 
The following subchapter will look at the basic definitions connected to the watercourse. 
 
 
 
5.2 Basic definitions 
 
 
The disagreements that lead to the rupture of the second Joint Technical Committee in 
1993 after 16 meetings, constituted in great part in different definitions of the object of the 
negotiation.141 Turkey and Syria regard the Euphrates and the Tigris as forming one single 
watercourse while Iraq defines them as two separate watercourses. Secondly, Turkey 
defines the Tigris and the Euphrates as a transboundary watercourse, and not an 
international watercourse, and claims thereby that it is “not subject to international rules”, 
as stated by the former Turkish minister of State, Kamran Inan.142 The questions in the 
following are thus naturally if the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers form one or two 
watercourses, and further, whether they are international or transboundary. 
 
 
 
5.2.1 The watercourse 
 
Turkey and Syria agree that the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers must be treated as one 
single watercourse, and that the total amount of water in both rivers must be the basis for 
discussion of allotment between the riparians. Iraq, on the other hand, claims that the two 
rivers must be seen as two separate watercourses, and that the discussion of allocation 
must be restricted to the Euphrates. If the Tigris and the Euphrates constitute one single 
watercourse, the amount of water to be allotted to each riparian would be calculated from 
the total supply of both rivers. Since Iraq at present utilizes large parts of the Tigris alone 
but also is dependent on the water from the Euphrates, a combined calculation could bring 
serious consequences to the already water scarce country. Iraq’s argument is naturally 
understandable, although not necessarily legally correct. 
 
In the UNWC, article 2, the term “watercourse” is defined as “a system of surface waters 
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus”. The phrasing of the article does not restrict the 
term “watercourse” to single rivers or main rivers, but defines it holistically by including all 
minor and tributary rivers as well as connected groundwaters. The article thus has a large 
scope and enframes the watercourse’s ecosystem. The definition also reflects the role of 
human interference in the watercourse, since intervention in one part of the system usually 
will influence or bring consequences to other parts of it.  
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As seen earlier, the UNWC has not entered into force, and is not considered a source of 
conventional international law. But some of the articles of the convention were 
codifications of customary international law, and some have later become international 
custom. The question is therefore firstly whether the UNWC’s definition of the term 
“watercourse” is in correspondence with customary international law, and secondly 
whether the Euphrates and Tigris rivers form one single watercourse as claimed by Turkey 
and Syria, or two separate watercourses, as claimed by Iraq.143 
 
In order to be considered international custom, the conception of the watercourse as a 
system of rivers, must be the subject of “a general practice” that is “accepted as law”.144  
 
Chapter three of the Versailles Treaty contains clauses that regulate the usage of specific 
international rivers. In article 331, parts of the rivers Elbe, Vltava, Oder, Niemen and 
Danube are declared international rivers, including “all navigable parts of these river 
systems which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea”.145 The article 
refers to the rivers as “river systems”, which includes more than just the canal of the main 
river. The same is done in article 362, where the jurisdiction of the Central Rhine 
Commission was extended to encompass specific channels, but also “any other parts of the 
Rhine river system which may be covered by the General Convention”.146 The system of 
rivers as a unity was thereby practiced in the 1919 peace treaty. Likewise are the “Madrid 
Declaration” (1911) of the Institute of International law; the “Convention Relating to the 
Development of Hydraulic Power”, adopted by the Conference on Communications and 
Transit at Geneva 1923; the “Declaration of the Seventh Pan-American Conference on the 
Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers”, adopted at Montevideo in 1933; 
and the Resolution adopted by the Inter-American Bar Association at Buenos Aires in 1957, 
all strongly inspired by the concept of the river system.147 
 
In the “River Oder”-case, the Permanent International Court of Justice thoroughly refers to 
the Oder as a river system, with reference to the Versailles Treaty. The judgement 
determines the jurisdiction of the Oder Commission, and by employing the concept of the 
river system the Court found that the Commission could extend its jurisdiction to include 
the tributaries to the Oder, even when these tributaries were entirely situated within the 
territory of one single state. The River System concept thus creates a unity of several rivers 
and tributaries, without regard to territorial borders, provided that they form a natural 
whole. Although both the Versailles Treaty and the River Oder judgement concern the 
freedom of navigation, the conception of the river system is general and thus applicable 
also for other uses of a watercourse.148 
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The International Law Association proclaimed in 1958 that one of the agreed principles in 
international law was that a “system of rivers and lakes in a drainage basin should be 
treated as an integrated whole (and not piecemeal)”.149 The concept of the system of rivers 
was thus considered an agreed principle of international law in 1958. Another example in 
favour of the river system is the Indus Waters Treaty, where the title itself reflects a 
quantity of rivers, naturally assembled in a coherent system; including the main rivers, their 
tributaries and connecting lakes.150 Consequently, the six main rivers, which are distributed 
between India and Pakistan in the treaty, together form a river system with its natural 
tributaries and lakes. Similarly, the Treaty of the River Plate Basin refers to the whole basin 
of the River Plate and thus employs a broad definition of a river system. 
 
Teclaff argues that the concept of the river system was perceived already towards the end 
of the 19th century when the water use was intensified, and that the need to treat the rivers 
as whole systems “becomes clear and urgent under the impact of threatened climate 
change”.151 Environmental regards are increasingly important in relation to the present 
climatic challenges, and while the ecosystem is progressively considered as a part in 
agreements concerning natural resources, the concept of the river system harmonizes with 
this development.  
 
The understanding of a watercourse as a system of rivers is thereby a “general practice”. 
Further, the decisive question is whether this definition has been “accepted as law”. 
 
The record of the 62nd meeting of the sixth committee of the UN General Assembly show 
that there were no objections or reservations to the definition of the term “watercourse” in 
article 2 litra a of the UN Convention, and that the article was adopted.152 This shows a 
broad consensus in the definition of the term “watercourse”, and also indicates opinio juris.  
However, such meeting records should be interpreted with great care since objections or 
lack of such does not create any binding obligations upon the member states and cannot be 
interpreted as if they did. The lack of protest against the definition of the term 
“watercourse” is certainly favourable for the opinio juris, but can not be the sole source for 
it. 
 
A second argument is the fact that the conception of the watercourse as a system of rivers 
has been employed in agreements and treaties for several decades, without any protests or 
debates regarding its position as law. On the contrary - the concept still is gaining a wider 
area of application and broader support. In the UNECE’s Convention for the Protection and 
use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, the term “transboundary 
waters” is defined as “any surface or ground waters which mark, cross or are located on 
boundaries between two or more States”.153 The Biodiversity convention does not concern 
watercourses in particular but addresses the protection of ecosystems, which it defines as 
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“a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living 
environment interacting as a functional unit”.154 A watercourse and its groundwater and 
tributaries clearly constitute an important part of an ecosystem, and are included in the 
holistic definition. The increasing focus on protection of ecosystems and ecosystem-based 
management of natural resources strengthens the international consensus on the broad 
definition of the term “watercourse”. 
 
Henceforth, the conception of the watercourse as a system of rivers is a “general practice” 
and “accepted as law”, and is thereby customary international law. 
 
 
The second question is accordingly, whether the Euphrates and Tigris rivers form one single 
watercourse, as Turkey argues, or two separate watercourses, as claimed by Syria and 
Iraq.155 
 
In order to be considered as one single watercourse, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers must 
“by virtue of their physical relationship [constitute] a unitary whole”, and normally flow 
“into a common terminus”, according to article 2 of the UNWC. In the Iraqi village al-
Qurnah, 74 kilometres northwest of Basrah, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers unite and form 
one single river, the Shatt-al-Arab. This combined river flows for 200 km on the Iraqi-Iranian 
border, before emptying into the Persian Gulf. Thus, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers flow 
into “a common terminus”, as the UNWC advocates in article 2 litra a.156  
 
Consequently, the decisive issue is whether the rivers constitute a “unitary whole”. In its 
commentaries to the UNWC, the ILC accentuates that this analysis must be a “matter of 
common sense and practical judgement”.157  
 
The rivers rise in the Turkish mountains, scarcely 30 kilometres from each other.158 Until 
their confluence in the Shatt-al-Arab, they have almost completely different basins, only 
connected by the man-made Thartar Canal in Iraq. Turkey claims that the existence of the 
canal strengthens the conception of the rivers as one single watercourse.159 The canal 
diverts waters from the Tigris, just northwest of Baghdad, and into the Euphrates. It 
prevents seasonal flooding of Baghdad, and alleviates water shortages in the Euphrates. 
However, by bringing water from one river to the other, the canal increases the 
interconnection between the rivers before they unite in the Shatt-al-Arab. In this way, 
polluted water from the Tigris can affect the water of the Euphrates and its ecosystem. The 
Thartar Canal thereby clearly strengthens the “physical relationship” between the rivers. 
 
Nevertheless, the ILC states in its commentaries to article 2 that “the fact that two different 
drainage basins were connected by a canal would not make them part of a single 
"watercourse" for the purpose of the present articles”.160 According to the Commission’s 
intentions, the existence of a connecting canal is not per se sufficient for two rivers to form 
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a single watercourse, but the Thartar Canal must undoubtedly be seen as a factor in favour 
of considering the Euphrates and Tigris as one watercourse. 
 
Another factor in the discussion is the geography of the rivers. Although the twin rivers rise 
close to each other, they have completely different basins until they unite in the Shatt-al-
Arab. While the Euphrates flows westwards into Syria, and then southeast into and through 
Iraq, the Tigris flows southwards out of Turkey, marks the border between Syria and Iraq, 
before it flows southwards through Iraq.  The Euphrates River is 3000 km long and united 
with the Tigris for only the last 190 km of its basin, while the Tigris runs for 1660 km before 
constituting the Shatt-al-Arab.161 The rivers thus flow separately for respectively 93,6 % and 
89,6 % of their total length. The individuality of the river basins and their geographical 
independence of each other might be accounted in disfavour of regarding the rivers as a 
single watercourse. 
 
On the other hand, the two rivers are shared by the same three riparian states. Changes in 
water quantity or quality in one of the rivers, will automatically affect all three watercourse 
states, since the demand for water from the other river will increase. In this way, the 
usages of the two rivers are proportionate and interdependent. As utilization and 
consequences closely unites the riparians, it may be natural to consider the river as one 
single watercourse. 
 
Furthermore, besides their individual basins, the rivers have several similarities. Both the 
Tigris and the Euphrates are exotic rivers, meaning that they start in one climate and end 
up in a completely different one.162 Both rivers rise in the wet climate of the Turkish 
mountains, flow through a dry, flat and hot landscape, before they empty into the sea. 
Although flowing in parallel beds, the rivers nourish the same type of landscapes in the 
same riparian states.  
 
Additionally, the twin rivers together laid the foundation of the word’s earliest civilizations. 
The region of Mesopotamia was situated between the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers more 
than 8000 years ago. These early societies gave birth to agriculture and water management, 
and local culture and custom were thus created within the frame of the two rivers. And the 
land in this area had particularly fertile soil, due to the interaction and influence of both 
rivers. Hence, the historic development in the Mesopotamian region is attributed to the 
influence of both rivers, and counts in favour of considering the rivers as a single 
watercourse. 
 
Based on the factors above, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are to be considered as one 
single watercourse. The Turkish and Syrian argument is thereby in accordance with 
international law in this matter, while the Iraqi is not. 
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5.2.2 International or transboundary watercourse? 
 
The second point at issue is whether the Tigris-Euphrates is an international watercourse, 
as claimed by Syria and Iraq, or a transboundary watercourse as claimed by Turkey. 
 
In the UNWC article 2 litra b, the term “international watercourse” is defined as “a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States”. This definition encompasses 
all watercourses that either forms or crosses a border between states. The preliminary 
question thereupon is whether the UNWC’s definition of the term “international 
watercourse” is in consonance with customary international law. 
 
In its earlier days, international water law distinguished between successive (also called 
transboundary) and contiguous (also called international) watercourses. The contiguous 
watercourse formed the border between two or more states, so that the river banks were 
in two separate states; while the successive watercourse crossed the border between two 
(or more) states, and the river was thus fully situated within the territory of one state at the 
time.163 The representative of Turkey accentuated this distinction at the 62nd meeting of 
the sixth committee of the General Assembly, by reserving his position on article 2 litra b of 
the UN Convention as it “did not take account of the differences between watercourses 
which marked a border and transboundary watercourses”.164 By “watercourses which 
marked a border” the Turkish representative clearly refers to contiguous (or international) 
watercourses, as opposed to successive (or transboundary) watercourses. As seen above, 
the UNWC does not distinguish between contiguous and successive watercourses. 
 
The “Madrid Declaration”, adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 1911, 
differentiates between these two geographical alternatives.165 The first article of the 
declaration regulates watercourses which “forms the frontier of two States”; while “a 
stream [which] traverses successively the territories of two or more States” is dealt with in 
article two. In spite of this distinction, the article does not accord broader rights to the 
riparians of the successive watercourse. On the contrary, whereas the riparians of a 
contiguous watercourse must seek the consent of the other riparian before launching 
possibly detrimental projects; the riparians of the successive watercourse must take into 
consideration the interests of other riparians and the watercourse itself, before consuming 
or utilizing the water. Therefore, in spite of the explicit distinction, the declaration does not 
largely differentiate in the regulation of the different types of rivers. Although not a formal 
source of international law, the declaration may be read as an expression of the opinio juris 
in the early 1900’s. 
 
In the International Law Association’s Dubrovnik Resolution (1956) an “international river” 
is defined as “one which flows through or between the territories of two or more states”.166 
The resolution does not differentiate between the two types of rivers, which may be 
evidence of a development of the general conception of watercourses. Similarly, in an 
article from 1959, Griffin explains the concept of the “international watercourse” as a 
watercourse which “passes successively through the territory of more than one state 
(successive watercourse) or runs along the boundary of two states (contiguous 
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watercourse)”.167 Even if the distinction between the two types of watercourses exist, 
Griffin summons up the applicable international law without making legal distinction 
between them. 
 
Consequently, the UNWC’s definition of an international watercourse was commonly 
accepted already in the late 1950’s. Adopted treaties do not define the concept of the 
international watercourse, since a common understanding is the basis of the whole treaty. 
If one of the States did not consider the actual watercourse as international, it would 
certainly not conclude a treaty of water management with another riparian State.  
 
McCaffrey argues that the distinction between contiguous and successive watercourses 
over time has lost its value since “[t]he adverse effects of one state’s pollution of an 
international watercourse are just as real in another state whether the watercourse be 
successive or contiguous in character”, which makes the differentiation hard to justify.168 
This view harmonizes well with the ecosystem approach adopted in the UNWC. As the 
watercourse is nature-made and the state borders are human-made, it makes sense to 
treat the watercourse as a whole, no matter how it refers to the borders. This also creates 
continuity and foreseeability in the international legal landscape. 
 
Bearing in mind that 103 states voted in favour of the Convention in the General Assembly, 
and thus also in favour of its definition of the term “international watercourse”, the 
definition has been both generally practiced and accepted as law in accordance with article 
38 in the ICJ Status.169  
 
The UNWC’s definition of the term “international watercourse” is thereby in consonance 
with international customary law. 
 
 
The next question at issue is the whether the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse is an 
“international watercourse”, in accordance with the UNWC article 2 litra b. 
 
The Euphrates is situated within Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi territory. The Tigris is situated in 
Turkey and Iraq, and forms the border between both Syria and Turkey, and Syria and 
Iraq.170 Both the rivers of the watercourse are thereby partly “situated in different States”. 
 
The Tigris-Euphrates watercourse is an international watercourse, in accordance with the 
UNWC article 2 litra b. 
 
Accordingly, the Syrian and Iraqi arguments on this matter are in accordance with 
applicable international law, while Turkey’s arguments are not.171 
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However, a new question then rises; namely if Turkey has been a persistent objector to this 
definition, and thus can be exempt from complying with the customary definition. 
 
In the “Fisheries Case” between the United Kingdom and Norway, the main question was 
how to determine the Norwegian territorial coastline.172 Norway had her own historical way 
of determining the line, while the United Kingdom claimed that Norway had to follow the 
international ten-mile rule. The International Court of Justice found that the ten-mile rule 
had not “acquired the authority of a general rule of international law” and that “[i]n any 
event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway in as much as 
she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast”.173 The Court thus 
acknowledged that objections towards the existence of a customary rule might excuse a 
state from respecting it. 
 
In Fitzmaurice‘s view, the court was “not intending here to enunciate any general principle 
of avoidance of the rules of international law by a process of non-acceptance, but was 
acceding to part of Norway’s argument concerning her historic rights.”174 This view is 
strengthen by the nature of international law, whose “rules […] are ipso facto applicable to 
all States members of the international community, by virtue of their membership”.175 The 
point of departure, according to Fitzmaurice, is that states can not decide freely which rules 
of international law they will be bound by. A state is thus bound by international law as a 
consequence of being a member of the international community. Nevertheless, the Court 
acknowledges in the passage quoted above that Norway had acquired exemption from the 
rules, since she had been opposed to the rule from its inception. Fitzmaurice thus concludes 
that the “essence of the matter is dissident from the rule while it is in process of becoming 
one, and before it has crystallized into a definite and generally accepted rule of law”.176 
 
The pivotal question is thereby whether Turkey has consequently objected to the 
“international watercourse”-definition before it became applicable customary law. 
 
At the above-mentioned 62nd meeting of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, 
the draft articles, which later became the UNWC, was debated and adopted. The Turkish 
delegate expressed his reservation against article 2 paragraph b because it did not “take 
account of the difference between watercourses which marked a border and 
transboundary watercourses”.177 With this statement, the Turkish delegate clearly 
expresses his disagreement with the definition, together with the intention not to be bound 
by that specific provision. Later, at the 99th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the 
Turkish delegate stated that Turkey did not intend to sign the UN Convention, and that “this 
Convention does not and shall not have any legal effect for Turkey in terms of general and 
customary international law”. These announcements clearly expresses that Turkey objected 
to the definition in 1997. 
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Disagreement over the characterization of the rivers was also the reason for the break 
down of the tripartite JTC in 1993. The Committees mandate was to determine methods 
and procedures that could “lead to a definition of the reasonable and appropriate amount 
of water that each country would need from both rivers”.178 The Committee was 
established between Turkey and Iraq in 1980, and Syria joined in 1983. However, the 
negotiations came to a stop after 16 meetings. Turkey thus also objected towards the 
definition during this period. 
 
In 1968, Turkey concluded an agreement with Bulgaria concerning the cooperation of their 
common rivers; the Meric, Tunca, Degirmendere and Rezve. In the agreement’s preamble, 
the rivers are said to “intersect or form the frontier between the two countries”, but the 
rest of its provisions do not distinguish between these two types of watercourses.179 The 
Meric and Tunca are flowing into Turkey from Bulgaria, and constitutes the border between 
Turkey and Greece; while the Degirmendere and Rezve are partly contiguous and partly 
successive rivers. The fact that the rivers of both kinds are treated equally in the treaty can 
not be interpreted as a general rejection from Turkey’s side of the importance of 
differentiation between them. But it shows that Turkey, in this particular relation, has 
agreed to consider the two types of watercourses equally, and entered into an agreement 
on the joint management of a group of shared watercourses. The Turkish-Bulgarian 
agreement can thus not be understood as an argument against the Turkish consistency of 
the watercourse-definition. 
 
Nevertheless, the first Joint Technical Committee of the Tigris-Euphrates riparians came to 
an end already in 1965 because of great disaccord about, inter alia, whether the rivers were 
transboundary or international.180 Turkey claimed that the rivers were transboundary 
rivers, while the two other riparians saw them as international. Turkey has thus endured 
her objections against the lack of distinction between different types of watercourses since, 
at least, 1965.  
 
Having established Turkey’s history of objection, the question is at what time the present 
definition of the international watercourse became the applicable international law.  
 
Article 8 of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (1815), addresses “[t]he powers whose 
territories are separated or traversed by the same navigable river”.181 The two types of 
rivers are mentioned specifically, acknowledging their different nature. But as in the 
Madrid-declaration, the distinction does not have any legal importance since the river types 
are treated equally. Although the Congress of Vienna was occupied with questions of 
navigation, the provision is relevant as evidence of the conception of watercourses at the 
time. 
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Likewise, the Institut de Droit International distinguished in its resolution on “Utilisation of 
Non-maritime International Waters” (1961), between “water which traverse or border [a 
state’s] territory” without according any legal importance to the distinction.182  
The Inter-American Bar Association defined in 1957 an international watercourse as “every 
water-course or system of rivers or lakes (non maritime waters) which may traverse or 
divide the territory of two or more states” and concluded that such a system would be 
called a “system of international waters”.183 The distinction is thus mentioned, but erased 
immediately after. Griffin also rejects the distinction between the two types of 
watercourses when he declares, in 1959, that the “historical concept [of two types of 
watercourses] is of no utility in the context of uses the effects of which are spread 
internationally by means of the watercourse itself”.184 Similarly, the International Law 
Association defines the term “drainage basin” in its “Helsinki Rules” (1966), as “a 
geographical area extending over two or more States determined by the watershed limits 
of the system of waters”. The “Helsinki Rules” thus expands its area of application by 
employing the concept of the water system, and does not differentiate between contiguous 
and successive watercourses.  
 
These examples show that the uniform definition of the watercourse was emerging and 
developing in the 1960’s. When Turkey explicitly resisted accepting this definition in 1965, 
she was protesting against the definition before it became a clear rule of law. 
 
Turkey objected to the international watercourse-definition before it became applicable 
international law. 
 
Although Turkey did object, the rule towards which she objected must be seen in its 
international context. As the rule is a fragment of an international legal body, the practical 
and legal impact of such objection must be considered holistically, in light of the 
consequences it may cause to other members of the international community. The last 
question is thus whether the differences in defining the watercourse-term can have legal 
significance in this matter.  
 
The ICJ expresses in the “Fisheries Case” that “[t]he delimitation of sea areas has always an 
international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as 
expressed in its municipal law […] the validity of the delimitation with regard to other 
States depends upon international law”. Even if the Court here refers to delimitation of 
territorial sea areas, the view is relevant for the definition of international watercourses 
since such a definition also will determine the rights of other states. Additionally, the 
subject matter for international watercourses is water as a vital resource, while the 
delimitation of sea territory mainly has economical value. This increases the relevance of 
the Court’s view for the present matter. 
 
As the Court states, a matter of international law is determined by the rules of international 
law. The validity of Turkey’s distinction between transboundary and international 
watercourses thereby depend upon the rules of international law. As seen above, these 
rules do not support Turkey’s definition. 
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Similarly, the question of defining a watercourse as transboundary or international has few, 
if any, practical consequences.  Even if the twin rivers rise within Turkish territory, this fact 
does not give Turkey a right to define them unilaterally in a way that limits the rights of 
other riparians. Whether called transboundary or international, the rivers flow through 
other states’ territory and gives these states a basic right to an equitable share of the 
water. The internationality of the watercourse imposes the rules of international law in the 
field; inter alia the principle of equitable utilization, recognized by Turkey.185 
 
The pivotal point for the internationality of watercourses seems to be, according to state 
practice and judgement from international courts, whether or not they touch other states’ 
territories. When a watercourse is in contact with the territory of more than one state, 
rights are generated for all these states. There is no legal reason why these rights should be 
fundamentally different, depending on the geography of the watercourse. As McCaffrey 
formulates, “it is virtually impossible to justify a legal regime that would, for example, allow 
unbridled use of successive watercourses but require that contiguous watercourses be 
utilized in an equitable and reasonable manner.”186  
 
Defining the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse as an international rather than a transboundary 
watercourse does not change, either for Turkey, Syria or Iraq, the right to an equitable 
share of the watercourse. And a differing definition of the term watercourse will thereby 
not have legal significance in this matter. 
 
Hence, Turkey cannot play the role of the persistent objector towards the commonly 
accepted definition of the watercourse term.  
 
The Turkish definition of the watercourse term is thus not in accordance with international 
law. 
 
 
 
5.3 The written agreements 
 
 
Two bilateral agreements have been concluded regarding the allocation of water in the 
Euphrates River. One agreement between Syria and Turkey, regarding the minimum 
quantity of water to be released from the Turkish dams and flow into Syria; and one 
between Syria and Iraq, dividing this amount of water between the two downstream states. 
Debates have arisen regarding the applicability and relevance of these agreements, and the 
three riparians have differing opinions on their validity and contents. In this subchapter, the 
binding force of the agreements will be examined, together with their equitability. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Syrian-Turkish agreement 
 
Syria is both an upstream and a downstream riparian to both the Euphrates and the Tigris. 
While the Euphrates flows through Syria for 710 kilometres of its total length, the Tigris 
                                                 
185
 Turkey Water Report, Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2009, page 48 
186
 McCaffrey, 2010, page 45 
 52 
constitutes the north-eastern border between and Syria and Turkey, and Syria and Iraq for 
total length of 44 kilometres.187 The Euphrates is the largest river in Syria and her biggest 
source of renewable freshwater.188 Due to her position on the watercourse, Syria has 
earlier alternatively claimed both the theory of absolute territorial integrity and absolute 
territorial sovereignty as protection for her interests.189 But after having ratified the UNWC 
in 1998, Syria endorses the theory of limited territorial sovereignty and the principle of 
equitable utilization.  
 
In 1987, prior to the filling of the Ataturk dam, Turkey and Syria signed the “Protocol on 
Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of Turkey and the 
Syrian Arab Republic”, containing their agreements on matters belonging to several 
different fields, water being one of them. According to the Protocol’s article 6, Turkey’s 
obligation of releasing a yearly average of 500 m3/s of water should persist “[d]uring the 
filling up period of the Atatürk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters of 
the Euphrates among the three riparian countries”. This time perspective gives the 
agreement a provisory appearance, especially since the Atatürk dam was opened in 1992. 
However, the “final allocation of the waters” has not been settled between the three 
watercourse states, and the agreement is therefore still in force. 
 
Primarily, the question is whether the protocol, fully or partly, can be interpreted as a 
binding agreement that generates obligations for the two parties. 
 
The name of an agreement may often give an impression of its content and ambitions, but 
is not in itself decisive. Although the agreement is called “Protocol”, this does not 
necessarily mean that the agreement is free from obligation.190 According to the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties article 2 litra a, a “treaty” is “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law […]”. The 
article thus imposes two conditions; the agreement must be written, and also governed by 
international law. Since the protocol is clearly both written and signed, the pivotal issue is 
whether its content is “governed by international law”.  
 
The Protocol regulates matters of “Economic Cooperation” between Turkey and Syria. To 
the extent they are settled in the protocol, these matters are not governed by municipal 
law. By entering such agreement, the two states withdraw the settled matters from their 
national jurisdiction and submit them to the rules of international law. In this manner the 
content of the treaty is “governed by international law”. 
 
The criterion of government by international law also includes the parties’ intention to be 
bound by the treaty.191 Such intentions will necessarily be reflected in the wording of each 
treaty obligation and in the parties’ actions. In the Protocol’s article 6, Turkey has 
undertaken “to release a yearly average of more than 500 m3/sec at the Turkish-Syrian 
border”. This obligation is concrete and appears to be the result of negotiations. The 
remaining articles of the treaty are settling intentions, and are not nearly as concrete as the 
obligation in article 6. Compared to article 9 of the treaty, where the parties agree “in 
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principle to construct and operate jointly projects in the lands of both countries”, the 
obligation in article 6 is stringent, countable and manageable. The wording of the article 
implies a will to be bound by its contents, and article 6 of the protocol is thereby “governed 
by international law”. 
 
Conclusively, the protocol is, partly, “governed by international law” and thus also an 
agreement that binds and generates obligations for the two parties. 
 
 
Secondly, the question is whether the protocol’s article 6 is in harmony with the principle of 
equitable utilization. 
 
Being provisional, the protocol does not provide any final solutions to the question of 
allocation in the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. It does not acknowledge any basic rights to 
either Syria or Iraq, or take into account the Iraqi use of the river. No other factors of 
allocation are mentioned, and the agreed quantity of water is not justified or explained in 
any manner. 
 
However, being negotiated and accepted by the two states, the amount of water released 
must have been satisfactory for both riparians at the time when the protocol was signed. 
And bearing in mind that the protocol offers a provisory solution, in anticipation of a 
permanent allocation, it would be too laborious for the present thesis to analyze whether 
the agreement still is equitable at present, or whether the needs of the watercourse states 
has changed so much that the released amount no longer represents an equitable share.  
 
The most proximate conclusion is therefore that the protocol is not in clear disharmony 
with applicable international law. 
 
 
5.3.2 The Syrian-Iraqi agreement 
 
Syria and Iraq agreed on a division of the water of the Euphrates River in 1989. The “Joint 
Minutes” were signed by official representatives from both parties, and later ratified. The 
agreement allocates the water flowing into Syria from Turkey, and accords 58 % of it to Iraq 
and 42 % to Syria.192 The first question is consequently if the agreement is binding upon the 
two riparian states. 
 
The agreement is “in written form”, according to article 2 litra a of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. It regulates the allocation of water between the two states, and by 
signing and ratifying the treaty; the two parties have clearly had the intention of being 
bound by its provisions. The agreement is thereby also “governed by international law”. 
 
The treaty is binding upon the two riparian states. 
 
 
Subsequently the point at issue is whether the “Joint Minutes” between Iraq and Syria 
allocates the water equitably. 
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Article 1 of the “Joint Minutes” states that the “Iraq water share on the border region 
between Iraq and Syria is 58 % as a fixed annual total percentage […] of the water of 
Euphrates Rivers allowed to pass in Syria through the border with Turkey, and the Syrian 
share of water is the remainder quantity 42 % of the water of Euphrates River allowed to 
pass through the border between Turkey and Syria”.  
 
The article does not mention basic legal rights to the watercourse directly, but by agreeing 
to share the water the parties implicitly acknowledge each others right to utilize the 
watercourse. This differs from the agreement between Syria and Turkey, where Turkey 
agrees to let a minimum amount of water flow into Syria. In this latter agreement, the 
amount of water does not reflect any acknowledgment of rights, and is more an expression 
of political will. While a 58-42 % division of the river’s flow indicates recognition by Syria, as 
the upstream state, of the needs and rights of the downstream state.  Although not 
explicitly acknowledging the basic rights to the utilization of the watercourse, the 
agreement is neither in disharmony with applicable international law. 
 
Like the Syrian-Turkish agreement above, the “Joint Minutes” is also a “provisional 
division”. As stated in paragraph two of the minutes, the agreement was reached in order 
to “facilitate the fulfilment of [both parties’] common wish [of] reaching a trilateral 
agreement with Turkey around the division of the waters of Euphrates River”. The 
agreement does thereby not establish any definite allocation of the waters. The quantity of 
water allotted between the two parties will depend on the amount flowing from Turkey 
into Syria.  
As was the case for the Syrian-Turkish agreement, it is difficult to determine whether the 
actual allocation of the water between Syria and Iraq is equitable. 
 
The most accurate conclusion is thereby that the “Joint Minutes” between Iraq and Syria is 
not in disharmony with international law. 
 
 
 
5.4 Views on sovereignty and equitable use 
 
 
5.4.1 Turkey’s claim for sovereignty 
 
In the ”Turkey Water Report” the Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
declares that “Turkey is of the view that each riparian country in a transboundary system 
has the sovereign right to make use of the waters in its territory”.193 Subsequent to this 
declaration, the report acknowledges the principles of non-harmful use and equitable 
utilization, but the principle of state sovereignty seems nevertheless to be the point of 
departure for Turkey’s water politics. In its conclusion, the report confirms this priority by 
listing the same three principles in the above-mentioned order. Similarly, the Turkish 
delegate to the UN General Assembly expressed this view during the UNWC voting, by 
claiming that the convention did not “make any reference to the indisputable principle of 
the sovereignty of the watercourse States over the parts of international watercourses 
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situated in their territory”.194 Turkey also objected towards this during the adoption of the 
final version of the draft articles to the convention.195 
 
Although the principle of state sovereignty is obvious in international law, Turkey protests 
against the lack of explicit mentioning of this principle in international agreements. As 
expressed in the national water report, Turkey ranks the principle of state sovereignty 
above the principle of equitable utilization. Although it is evident that a claim for 
sovereignty can hinder the equitable utilization in practice, an interesting question is 
whether such claim for sovereignty can present a legal obstruction for an equitable 
allocation of the water of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. 
 
As stated in the “Lake Lanoux”-arbitration, a common conception of the principle of state 
sovereignty is that it “plays the part of a presumption [and must] bend before all 
international obligations”. In this sense, the territorial sovereignty is central when a matter 
is unregulated. Sovereignty is a quality granted to sovereign states through international 
agreement and the same quality is restricted through other obligations. Concluding a treaty 
is thus a proportional waiver of sovereignty. Hence, the principle of state sovereignty 
differs in nature from the principle of equitable utilization; sovereignty is presumed where 
nothing else is agreed, and is negatively delimited, while the principle of equitable 
utilization is positively delimited.  
 
In the “Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation”, the parties agrees in article IV that “the 
exclusive use and utilization of natural resources within their respective territories is a right 
inherent in the sovereignty of each state and that the exercise of their right shall not be 
subject to any restriction other than those arising from International Law”.196 The principle 
of sovereignty is here affirmed explicitly as an unrestricted right belonging to all the 
watercourse states, but the treaty acknowledges that the sovereignty is restricted by 
principles of international law. The wording of the article implies that principles of 
international law are positive and perceptible regulations, while the sovereignty is an 
underlying right and thus negatively defined. The reference to “International Law” in the 
Amazonian Cooperation-treaty refers to all kinds of international law - also customary 
principles like the principle of equitable utilization - as accepted restrictions on the state 
sovereignty. In these two examples, the claim for sovereignty can not present a legal 
obstruction for the equitable utilization. 
 
By admitting the principle of sovereignty such an explicit priority, Turkey accords it 
dominance over the principle of equitable utilization, so that the latter must adjust to the 
first. Turkey thus says that the principle of equitable utilization apply as long as it does not 
confine the principle of state sovereignty in any considerable manner. This order of priority 
differs from the common conception, since Turkey seems to define the principle of 
sovereignty positively, as a right that can not be significantly repressed by other principles 
of international law. As stated by Salman, this “notion indicates a total failure to 
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comprehend the basic rules of contemporary international water law that have long 
rejected the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty”.197  
 
Interestingly, in the Turkish-Bulgarian cooperation treaty, the sovereignty of the states is 
not mentioned, and the treaty refers to the cooperation in common water management 
“for the benefit of the two Contracting Parties” and projects that “will ensure new mutual 
benefits and conditions for the two Contracting Parties”.198 The main focus of the treaty is 
the common management and benefit, in accordance with “the principles of international 
law and good-neighbourly relations”.199 Bearing in mind that Turkey is a downstream state 
on the Meric and its tributary the Tunca, it is interesting to observe that Turkey concluded a 
treaty that acknowledges equal rights to both the upstream and the downstream state in 
the utilization of the river. This inconsistency in practice reveals recognition of general 
principles of international law, and that the refusal to employ these in the Tigris-Euphrates 
basin may be a question of political will and economic loss.  
 
Conclusively, the principle of equitable utilization and the principle of state sovereignty are 
different in nature, and the former is a positively defined obligation of international law 
that has the power to restrict the state sovereignty. When Turkey accepts this 
understanding towards Bulgaria, it can easily be interpreted as proof of the difficult political 
and economic aspect of the utilization of international watercourses. Nevertheless, the 
principle of state sovereignty is a quality that is restricted by other international principles 
and obligations, and it can thereby not present a legal obstruction for an equitable 
allocation of the water of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse 
 
The Turkish emphasis on the supremacy of the state sovereignty is thereby not in 
accordance with applicable international law. 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Iraq’s claim for absolute integrity 
 
As the downstream riparian to both the Euphrates and the Tigris, Iraq is in the most 
vulnerable position to be affected by the utilization of its co-riparians. According to 
international non-governmental sources Iraq is in the midst of a severe water crisis, 
experiencing at the same time a steady reduction in available freshwater, and deterioration 
of water quality.200 Water projects and increased consummation of water in Turkey and 
Syria can reduce the flow of the Euphrates in Iraq with as much as 90 %.201 Return flow 
from the planned irrigation systems in Turkey and Syria also represents a serious threat to 
Iraq’s water quality, since nearly half of the water flowing into Iraq from the Euphrates will 
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have been in contact with pesticides and fertilizers.202 Consequently, Iraq is in great need of 
a trilateral agreement over the utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. 
 
Until the 1960’s, Iraq was the only riparian who used the water from the twin rivers in any 
extensive manner. The Turkish and Syrian dam projects in the 1960-70’s became a threat to 
the Iraqi water supply, and were subject to massive protest from the Iraqi authorities.203 
Iraq then claimed the theory of absolute territorial integrity, which protects the lower 
riparian’s interests at the cost of the upper riparians.204  
 
As seen earlier, the theory of absolute territorial integrity was rejected in the “Lake 
Lanoux”-arbitration and has not been given recognition since. The arbitration tribunal 
concluded that “the rule that States may utilize the hydraulic power of international 
watercourses only on condition of a prior agreement between the interested States cannot 
be established as a custom, even less as a principle of law”. The lower riparian can thus not 
demand that the upper riparians seek its consent before utilizing the parts of the shared 
watercourse situated in their territories. As expressed by McCaffrey, this doctrine has not 
“been accepted sufficiently broadly to amount to a regional, let alone an international 
custom”.  
 
Although not longer claimed by Iraq, the theory of absolute territorial integrity is not in 
accordance with international custom.  
 
 
 
5.4.3 Iraq’s ancient uses 
 
Another of Iraq’s main arguments has been that her ancient uses of the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse generates protected rights of utilization. In the following discussion it must be 
remembered that Iraq accepted the UNWC in 2001, and is, as one of the 25 parties to the 
Convention, correspondingly obliged to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose of [the] treaty”, according to The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
article 18 litra a. Having accepted the UNWC without any reservations, Iraq must act in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the convention, including its core principles – 
equitable utilization and the obligation not to cause harm to other watercourse states. 
As discussed above, in chapter 4.2, the state sovereignty is not absolute, but restricted, 
inter alia, by the principle of equitable utilization that protects both the watercourse states 
and the watercourse’s ecosystem. Iraq is hence obliged to adjust her conception of 
sovereignty to harmonize with the equitable apportionment of the other riparians. 
 
Iraq has claimed her ancient usage of the Tigris-Euphrates, which gave birth to the early 
civilizations, as an argument for special rights to the watercourse.205 The question here is 
thus whether Iraq’s historical use of the Tigris-Euphrates generates protected right to utilize 
the watercourse. 
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Since no consistent state practice or treaty provision protects historic uses of a 
watercourse, the question must be explored through other sources of international law.  
 
The UNWC art 6, paragraph one, emphasizes that “all relevant factors and circumstances” 
must be taken into account, and paragraph three establishes that these relevant factors 
“are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole”. The 
evaluation of equity is thereby unique to every watercourse and its watercourse states, 
based on the specific circumstances in each case. 
 
In article 6 paragraph one litra e, lists “[e]xisting and potential uses of the watercourse” as 
relevant factors for the determination of equity. The rule thus refers both to the utilization 
that is established and accustomed, and to the prospective or planned utilization. As 
pointed out by the ILC working group, the reference to both types of uses is done to 
“emphasize that neither is given priority, while recognizing that one or both factors may be 
relevant in a given case”.206 However, by “[e]xisting uses” is clearly meant the present 
utilization of the watercourse, as opposed to the anticipated. Historical uses, on the other 
hand, are earlier forms of utilization and development of a watercourse, uses that will 
generally have changed greatly through the centuries. The protection of existing uses is 
reasonable since a state may face great difficulties if its utilization of a watercourse easily 
could be hindered or undermined by any project from another watercourse state. “Existing 
[uses]” in the UNWC article 6 paragraph one litra e does thereby not include historical uses, 
and does not generate any protected rights. 
 
On the contrary, as stated by the ILC, a demand for allocation based on “natural” or 
“historical” rights “amounts to exercising a veto on the rights of upper riparians to 
reasonable and equitable shares of the waters of common rivers.”207 Giving priority to 
historical uses of a watercourse could thereby cause legal harm to the co-riparians, since it 
would affect their possibilities to exploit the resources on their territories. 
A protection and priority of historical uses would thus be inconsistent with the principle of 
equitable utilization, and accordingly also with customary international law. 
 
McCaffrey points out that downstream countries usually are “flatter, and thus better suited 
for agriculture” while upstream countries are more mountainous and have had “few ways 
in which to develop their water resources before the advent of large dams and 
hydroelectric power”.208 Consequently, lower riparians generally develop their water 
resources earlier than upper riparians. This is also the case of the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse. Both rivers rise in a mountainous terrain in the south of Turkey, where the 
climate is cold and the rivers barely accessible, whereas the watercourse’s landscape in Iraq 
is flat and warm with fertile soil that accordingly makes it easy to access and utilize the 
watercourse. Historical utilization is thereby often connected to the watercourse states’ 
position on the watercourse, and their economic development. But as some claim – the 
economic development of the watercourses is also highly dependent on their ability to 
utilize the watercourse early. Consequently, a protection of historical uses would 
encourage a “”race to the river” and [reward] the winner with absolute protection, 
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regardless of the merits of either its use or the potential uses of other states, and 
regardless of the optimal utilization of the drainage basin as a whole”.209 These regards thus 
speak in disfavour of the protection of historical uses in international law.  
 
Nevertheless, historical usage of a watercourse can neither be completely unprotected in 
international law. This would correspond with the theory of absolute sovereignty, where a 
State can develop the watercourse freely within its territory, without regard to the prior, 
existing or potential uses of other watercourse states. As seen in chapter 4.3, this theory 
has been rejected as a ruling principle of international law. The most reasonable solution is 
thereby that the protection of historic uses is determined through an evaluation of 
equitable utilization, in light of the other circumstances and relevant factors.210 
 
Iraq’s historical use of the watercourse does not generate protected right to utilize the 
watercourse. 
 
On this matter, the Iraqi argument is not in accordance with international law. 
  
 
 
5.4.4 Turkey’s interpretation of “equitable utilization” 
 
Although officially acknowledging that the principle of equitable utilization is a ruling 
principle of international law, Turkey has differing interpretations of its contents. The 
“Turkey Water Report”, states that “transboundary waters should be used in an equitable, 
reasonable and optimal manner”.211 Bearing in mind the Turkish definition of watercourses, 
this statement concerns watercourses that cross a border. According to the Turkish 
definition, equitable use means “the efficient and effective utilization of water, including 
the application of demand management principles, the use of modern water infrastructure 
and the implementation of water-saving irrigation techniques”.212 A preliminary question is 
thereby whether the Turkish interpretation of the term equitable utilization is principally in 
accordance with the international definition. 
 
As seen earlier, equitable utilization does not mean sharing the watercourse equally 
between its riparians, but is based on an evaluation of several different factors. The UNWC 
article 5 also states that a watercourse shall be used and developed “with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom”. Optimal and 
sustainable use of the watercourse is the preeminent measure of equitable utilization. The 
Turkish definition of equitable utilization as “efficient and effective” utilization of water 
seems to focus largely on the economic perspective of the utilization, and less on the 
environmental concerns. The ILC comments in relation to article 5 that attaining optimal 
utilization and benefits does not refer to “the “maximum” use, the most technologically 
efficient use or the most monetarily valuable use [but rather] implies attaining maximum 
possible benefits for all watercourse States and achieving the greatest possible satisfaction 
for all their needs, while minimizing the detriment to, or unmet needs of, each”.213 This is 
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also upheld in article 6, where the “[f]actors relevant to equitable and reasonable 
utilization” includes hydrological, social, environmental, economical and geographical 
factors. 
 
The Turkish emphasis on modern water infrastructure and water-saving techniques will 
contribute to a more optimal utilization of the watercourse, since such technology can 
reduce the watercourse states’ quantitative use of water without changing their utilization. 
As Turkey has new and modern dams and water management projects of her own, this 
claim is mainly addressed to her downstream riparians who “are wasting a lot of water and 
do not (therefore) need 500m3/s”.214 Efficient utilization is clearly a part of the equitable 
utilization. But the Turkish interpretation does not mention the sustainable utilization as an 
aim for the water management. Neither does the Turkish Water Report acknowledge the 
co-sovereignty of all the watercourse states and the need for cooperation amongst them. 
 
The Turkish focus on economic factors in defining equitable utilization is thus not principally 
in accordance with the international definition. 
 
 
Another topic of discussion is the relationship between the principle of equitable utilization 
and the obligation not to cause harm to other watercourse states. Turkey claims that the 
principle of equitable utilization has primacy above the no-harm principle. One of Turkey’s 
main objections against the UNWC was that it not “clearly established the supremacy of the 
fundamental principle of equitable and reasonable utilization over the obligation not to 
cause significant harm”.215 
 
The pivotal question is therefore if the principle of equitable utilization enjoys such primacy 
above the obligation not to cause harm to other watercourse states. 
 
An essential difference between these two principles is the interests they protect. The no-
harm principle protects a watercourse state against factual harm deriving from other 
states’ utilization of the watercourse. Factual harm can thus be caused by a deterioration of 
water quality, or a change in water quantity such as draught or flood. The principle of 
equitable utilization protects the watercourse states against legal harm from other 
watercourse states, as when one state’s use of the watercourse is a hinder for another 
watercourse state’s actual and potential use of its rightful share of the water resources. 
 
The no-harm principle is codified in art 7 first paragraph of the UNWC, which requires the 
watercourse states to “take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant 
harm to other watercourse States”. The wording of the article indicates that the obligation 
is relative, and subject to analysis. The article does not prohibit all harm causing activities, it 
merely obliges them to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states; and thus 
acknowledges that certain harm-causing activities may be accepted. This point of departure 
is strengthened in the second paragraph of the article, which regulates the duties of the 
performing state “[w]hen significant harm nevertheless is caused”. The no-harm principle is 
thereby not a strict obligation to restrain from harm causing activities, but rather an 
inducement not to cause significant harm, or as put by the ILC; an “obligation of due 
diligence”.216 
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If the principle of equitable utilization or the no-harm principle shall have primacy over the 
other, the superior principle must give a wider protection of the rights of the concerned 
watercourse state than the other principle does. For instance must the no-harm principle in 
such a case protect against significant harm deriving from another watercourse state’s 
utilization, although the utilization otherwise would be reasonable and equitable. And the 
principle of equitable utilization must, in its turn, permit activities that cause significant 
harm to another watercourse if the utilization on the whole is equitable and reasonable. 
 
One argument in favour of Turkey’s view is the reality of the UNWC article 7. When its 
paragraphs are read combined, the article obliges the watercourse states to take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm, but acknowledges at the 
same time that such harm nevertheless might be caused, and that the performing state in 
such a case must eliminate or mitigate the harm, and “where appropriate, to discuss the 
question of compensation”. When significant harm in some cases can be tolerated, the 
condition must be that the other aspects of the same utilization otherwise is equitable and 
reasonable, because significant harm could not be tolerated if the utilization causing the 
harm was inequitable, and the equity of the utilization is thereby a primary necessity. The 
structure and wording of the UNWC may thus indicate a primacy of the principle of 
equitable utilization above the no-harm principle. Since the obligation not to cause harm is 
relative and must be determined in relation to each concrete case, it seems to be inter-
related to the principle of equitable utilization. As harm may be tolerated under certain 
circumstances, McCaffrey points at the role of the obligation as a factor in the 
determination of equitable utilization; “significant harm may have to be tolerated in order 
to achieve an overall regime of equitable and reasonable utilization”.217  
 
In the “Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project”-case the ICJ was asked to decide whether the 
Slovakian utilization of the Danube River constituted a breach of international law. As 
Slovakia continued the project unilaterally, Hungary suffered both factual damage - by 
being deprived of water, and legal damage - by being deprived of its legal right to the 
water. However, the Court based its judgement solely on the principle of equitable 
utilization. After citing the River Oder-judgement and referring to the UNWC, the Court 
concluded that Slovakia, “by unilaterally assuming control over a shared resource, and 
thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural 
resources of the Danube”, had “failed to respect the proportionality which is required by 
international law”.218 In this manner, the Court employs the obligation not to cause harm as 
a factor in, or as a complement to, the determination of equitable utilization. The Court 
does not treat the no-harm obligation as an independent principle equal in strength to the 
principle of equitable utilization, but rather gives the principle of equitable utilization 
primacy above the no-harm obligation. 
 
The ILC’s Commentary on the draft convention also supports this view. Here the 
Commission states that the UNWC article 7 sets forth “a process aimed at avoiding 
significant harm as far as possible while reaching an equitable result in each concrete 
case”.219 Further, the Commission’s approach was based partly on the conclusion that 
“article 5 alone did not provide sufficient guidance for States in cases where harm was a 
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factor”. The overall aspiration thus seems to be the equitable result, with the avoidance of 
significant harm as an important factor on the way.  
 
As shown by the examples above, the principle of equitable utilization may embody the no-
harm principle since avoidance of factual harm is an element in determining the equitable. 
At the same time, the utilization of a watercourse might be equitable although significant 
factual harm is caused. Oppositely, the obligation not to cause harm cannot overrule the 
principle of equitable utilization. If extensive factual harm is caused to such a degree that 
the harm-causing utilization is no longer equitable, the no-harm principle is a component in 
that evaluation. Whereas if the harm is significant but the utilization still equitable due to 
other factors, the no-harm principle does not have supremacy above the principle of 
equitable utilization. 
 
However, the legal reality of this argument is doubtful, and might be based on a 
misconception of the two principles, as argued by Salman.220 The no-harm principle has, by 
some, been interpreted as to favour downstream states since it protects their existing uses, 
while the principle of equitable utilization has been favoured by upstream states since it 
accords them the right to utilize the watercourse without too much concern for the 
damage it might cause to the downstream states. However, as stated by Salman, a common 
misconception of international water law in general and the UNWC in particular, is that 
“harm can only “travel” downstream, and it is not recognized that upstream states can also 
be harmed by activities by downstream states”.221 But it is important to bear in mind that 
the principle of equitable utilization protects every watercourse states legal right to utilize a 
watercourse, and that a progressive lower riparian thus can cause harm to a poor upstream 
riparian by developing and consuming the entire water supply. The upper riparian would 
thus be excluded from the possibility of developing the watercourse within its territory, and 
suffer legal harm. This aspect of the principle “creates a clear linkage between the principle 
of equitable utilization, and the obligation not to cause harm”.222 Consequently, a claim for 
the supremacy of the principle of equitable utilization above the no-harm principle makes 
little sense, and could probably not be given any legal importance. Turkey’s claim is not 
mistaken, but legally superfluous. 
 
 
The principle of equitable utilization enjoys primacy above the no-harm principle. But since 
the distinction does not evoke any legal consequences for the parties to the Tigris-
Euphrates watercourse, it is difficult to determine whether the Turkish argument is in 
harmony with applicable international law. 
 
 
 
Having discussed the problems and disagreements, it is time to look at what the parties 
proposes as possible solutions to the Tigris-Euphrates situation, and what they actually 
agree in: 
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5.5 The proposed three-stage solutions 
 
 
During the first period of the Joint Technical Committee, the three watercourse states set 
forth plans for solving the disagreement over distribution and management of the Tigris-
Euphrates watercourse. Although bearing clear resemblance, the three proposals have 
basic differences and none of them have been trilaterally accepted. Even though they were 
set forth two decades ago, the solutions still have interest as reflections of the parties’ 
understanding of the situation and of how the allocation could possibly be managed. This 
last subchapter of the thesis will therefore analyze and compare the solutions in light of the 
principle of equitable utilization.  
 
 
 
5.5.1 Turkey’s three-stage plan 
 
Turkey’s proposed solution to the allocation of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse was first 
presented for the JTC in 1990, and later during bilateral talks with Syria and Iraq in 1993.223 
The plan is as follows:  
 
“Stage 1 – Inventory studies for Water Resources 
i. To exchange the whole available data (levels and discharges) of the selected gauging 
stations […] Experts of the three countries shall agree upon the nomination of the 
representative meteorological stations in Tigris-Euphrates Basin and exchange data on 
them as well as the whole available data concerning evaporation, temperature, rainfall, 
snowfall (if available) on monthly basis for the representative stations. 
ii. To check the above mentioned data 
iii. To measure jointly the discharges at the above mentioned stations in different seasons, 
if necessary 
iv. To evaluate and correct the measurements 
v. To exchange and check data about the quality of water (if such data is not available, to 
exchange it after it is obtained) 
vi. To calculate the natural flows at various stations after the estimation of water uses and 
water losses at various sites. 
 
Stage 2 – Inventory studies for Land Resources 
i. To exchange information concerning soil classification methods and drainage criteria used 
and practiced in each country. 
ii. To check the soil conditions for projects, planned, under construction and in operation. 
iii. If the studies indicated under item (ii) could not be carried for reasons acceptable to all 
sides, soil categories shall then be determined to the extent possible. 
iv. To study and discuss the crop-pattern determined according to soil classification and 
drainage conditions for projects, planned, under construction and in operation. 
v. To calculate irrigation and leaching water requirements based on the studies carried out 
in the above mentioned items for the projects planned, under construction and in 
operation. 
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Stage 3 – Evaluation of water and land resources 
 
i. To discuss and determine irrigation type and system for the planned projects aiming at 
minimizing water losses and to investigate the possibility of the modernization and 
rehabilitation of the projects in operation. 
ii. Based on the project-wise study under item (2 v.) to determine the total water 
consumption of the whole projects in each country including municipal and industrial water 
supply, evaporation losses from reservoirs and the conveyance losses in irrigation schemes. 
iii. To set up a simulation model which presents a river system schematically to analyze the 
water demand and supply balance, considering the possibility of transferring water from 
the Tigris to the Euphrates. 
iv. To discuss the methods and criteria for determining economic viability of the planned 
projects”. 224 
 
The Turkish plan is based on the conception of the Euphrates and Tigris as one single 
watercourse, and that the twin rivers’ resources should be analyzed and distributed 
jointly.225 The analysis and calculations in the plan is also meant to be monitored by an 
independent committee. 
 
 
 
5.5.2 Syria’s three stage plan 
 
Syria’s solution is similar, but slightly more mathematical than Turkey’s: 
 
“1. Each riparian declare its water demand separately 
2. The capacities of both rivers are calculated (in each riparian country) 
3. The water is shared according to the stated figures. But if the total demand exceeds 
the total supply, the exceeding amount should be deducted from the demand of 
each riparian country”. 226 
 
Syria considers the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse to be international, and thereby subject to 
the rules of international law. The Syrian proposal thus also reflects the insistence upon 
equitable utilization as the ruling principle of international law. 
 
 
 
5.5.3 Iraq’s three stage plan 
 
The Iraqi proposal also bears resemblance to the two others, and is based on a 
mathematical formula like the Syrian: 
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“1. Each riparian notifies its water demand for each of its completed projects, projects 
 under construction and planned projects 
1. Hydrologic data is exchanged on the Euphrates and Tigris waters 
2. The JTC calculates the demands of water for projects under operation, then for 
projects under construction and finally for the planned projects. The determination 
of needs for these projects shall then be made separately”. 227 
 
Iraq has earlier been opposed to the conception of the twin rivers forming a single 
watercourse, and it is not clear whether the plan means to examine the rivers jointly or 
separately.  
 
 
 
5.5.4 Comparison of the plans 
 
In comparing the proposed plans, the object is naturally to estimate whether they are in 
accordance with the principle of equitable utilization. 
A preliminary observation shows that all three plans are based on the needs of the riparian 
states. Syria’s and Iraq’s plans invite the states to identify their need for water before 
examining the available resources, while Turkey leaves the determination of needs to an 
independent committee. However, it may seem particular that all three plans are based on 
determining the needs of the watercourse states, and not on determining their rights. 
According to Wolf, this is a common approach in international watercourse treaties. A 
reason for this may be “that rights are not quantifiable and needs are”.228 Of course it is 
easier to reach a concrete distribution of the resources when each state claims its required 
amount of water. Another probable reason is that the level of mistrust and conflict 
between the watercourse states urges the states to secure their water supply through 
stating their actual needs rather than their claimed rights. Evaluation of equity on the basis 
of the watercourse states’ needs is therefore natural and current in the management of 
international watercourses. 
 
An important aspect of equitable utilization is that the consummation must be “consistent 
with adequate protection of the watercourse” and the aim for the “optimal and sustainable 
utilization” of the watercourse is also part of the equitability.229 In order to represent an 
equitable solution, the proposed three-stage plans must take account of this aspect.  
 
Although all three solutions are based on investigation of the available supply, only Turkey 
seems to encourage a more scrutinous research of the water and land resources, in order 
to find a justifiable form and degree of utilization. Whereas the Iraqi and Syrian solution 
suggests a determination of the available resources and an allocation of these between the 
riparians, the Turkish suggestion additionally seems to preserve the interests of the 
watercourse itself. In response to the two other plans, Turkish authorities have claimed 
that “the concept of “sharing the common resources by mathematical formula” represents 
a complete contradiction with the principle of “equitable utilization” which is the core 
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exercise in this field.”230 Although strongly expressed by Turkey, equitable utilization of a 
watercourse is also a sustainable one and this requires the consideration of the interests of 
both the watercourse and the ecosystem in determining the allocation of a watercourse. A 
determination based solely on the needs of the concerned states through a mathematical 
formula could cause overuse and exhaustion of the water resources. In this aspect the 
Turkish proposal harmonizes both with the UNWC’s obligation to protect the watercourse, 
and also with the global focus on sustainable development, and seems to be closer to 
applicable international law than the two others. 
 
In the Turkish proposal, the investigation of resources and the determination of 
consumption will be carried out by a joint body.231 This will oblige the watercourse states to 
abandon some of their sovereignty, but secures at the same time a neutral management of 
resources with focus on the optimal utilization, and not on the maximum benefit for each 
watercourse state. As set forth in the Turkish plan, optimal utilization also includes 
rehabilitation and modernization of existing projects to make the consumption more 
efficient. This approach has been coolly received by the two downstream states, since it 
would entail great economic challenges for them. However, as the optimal use plays an 
important part in the determination of equitable utilization, securing the efficiency of 
existing water management projects is cardinal. The Turkish plan seems more in harmony 
with the principle of equitable utilization in this particular matter. 
 
Also Iraq suggests the creation of a joint committee in her proposal. But whereas Iraq will 
charge the committee with the responsibility to determine the allocation of water, Turkey 
additionally wants the committee to carry out the necessary investigation of the resources. 
As the following examples will show, both the study of the watercourse and the 
administration by a joint committee are common ingredients in other international 
watercourse treaties:  
 
One of the aims of the Rhine-Convention is to achieve a “sustainable development of the 
Rhine ecosystem” and to ensure “environmentally sound and rational management of 
water resources”.232 The convention also accords the Rhine river commission responsibility 
for preparing “international measuring programmes and studies of the Rhine ecosystem 
and make use of their results”, to “make proposals for individual measures and 
programmes of measures” and to “evaluate the effectiveness of the actions decided upon, 
notably on the basis of the reports of the Contracting Parties and the results of the 
measuring programmes and studies of the Rhine ecosystem”.233 Likewise, the Mahakali 
Treaty ensures the creation of a river commission whose main functions will be to “seek 
information on and, if necessary, inspect all structures included in the Treaty and make 
recommendations to both the Parties to take steps which shall be necessary to implement 
the provision of this Treaty [and] recommendations to both the Parties for the conservation 
and utilization of the Mahakali River as envisaged and provided for in this Treaty”.234 
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The parties to the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty have also submitted to the “exchange of 
information and [to] prepare operational agreements and understandings” in order to 
produce “equitable and mutually beneficial results and achieve also the preservation of the 
environment and the conservation and rational utilization of the natural resources”.235 A 
joint commission is also present in the Mekong River Basin, and its functions are, inter alia, 
to “regularly obtain, update and exchange information and data necessary to implement 
[the present agreement]” and “to conduct appropriate studies and assessments for the 
protection of the environment and maintenance of the ecological balance of the Mekong 
River”.236 
 
The suggestions for a neutral body of administration is thus clearly in harmony with 
international practice in the field, and with view to the conservation and protection of the 
watercourse, the scientific study and research should also be carried out by the committee. 
Conclusively, both the Iraqi and the Turkish suggestion is in harmony with international law 
in this matter, although Turkey’s plan offers a broader and more sustainable solution. 
 
Yet another factor in the examination of the plans is the available provision of water. It has 
become clear during the last decades that the water supply in the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse is insufficient for the total demand of the three watercourse states.237 Since 
they cannot all satisfy their existing and planned needs, each riparian must reduce its needs 
in order to meet the available supply. The method of this reduction is the main difference 
between the Iraqi and the Syrian proposal. Syria suggests that the total amount of available 
water should be compared to the total amount of water needed by the three states, and if 
the need exceeds the supply, the exceeding amount should be “deducted from the demand 
of each riparian country”. The proposal leaves the specific reductions to the appreciation of 
each watercourse state, which is thereby free to decide whether it will reduce the existing 
or the potential uses. Although the Syrian proposal is equitable on account of the 
watercourse states, it does not take into consideration the interests of the watercourse and 
its ecosystem and can thereby not be in total harmony with the principle of equitable 
utilization. 
 
Iraq, on the other hand, suggests that the calculation of demand and supply shall be 
monitored by the JTC, with priority to the projects under operation, before the projects 
under construction and lastly the planned projects. This order of priority is understandable, 
since all states would favour the security of their existing water consumption. Turkey makes 
the same categorization in stage 2 of her plan. However, the UNWC art 6 litra e states both 
“existing and potential uses” as factors in the determination of equitable utilization. 
According to the ILC, the equality between the uses is meant to “emphasize that neither is 
given priority, while recognizing that one or both factors may be relevant in a given 
case”.238 The ILC thus declines any inherent order of priority between existing and potential 
uses of a watercourse, but acknowledges that one may be more relevant than the other, 
dependent on the actual situation. A priority of usage would thereby not contradict the 
principle of equitable utilization, if such an order of priority was acknowledged by all 
parties. The Iraqi proposal reflects her position on the watercourse, and the threat from the 
Turkish dam-projects, but it is not in disaccord with the principle of equitable utilization. 
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In spite of some differences, the three suggestions do not bear any fundamental 
contradictions. The main dissimilarity between them is the emphasis on independent 
research and environmental protection. However, none of the three-stage plans are in clear 
disharmony with the principle of equitable utilization. 
 
 
 
The three plans reveal that a will to cooperate does in fact exist between the three 
watercourse states, along with the idea to manage the watercourse jointly. Common 
management is thereby a possible solution for an equitable utilization of the Tigris-
Euphrates watercourse. This is also one of the themes in the next and last chapter that 
summons up the findings from chapters 4 and 5, and looks tentatively towards the future. 
 
 
 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
 
 
The three riparian states to the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse agree that the principle of 
equitable utilization is a ruling principle with regard to the usage of international 
watercourses. But the parties do not have the same understanding of the contents and 
extent of the principle, or of its applicability. As the parties disagree on the definition of the 
Tigris-Euphrates as an international or transboundary watercourse, they also disagree on 
whether the principle of equitable utilization applies on its utilization. 
 
This is one of the central problems in the Tigris-Euphrates conflict; the three riparians 
cannot conclude any cooperative allocation agreement because they disagree on the basic 
principles that should constitute the foundation for such an agreement. And because of the 
turbulent history in the region, and its increasing water scarcity, the three states are more 
focused on securing their domestic water supply, than to protect the resource and the 
mutual benefit. As long as no trilateral agreement exists, the three watercourse states will 
continue to develop individual water management projects, which will further reduce the 
amount of water that is available for sharing. The two main ingredients for the future 
cooperation are therefore trust and agreement on the meaning of the basic principles and 
definitions. 
 
To start with the latter, the basic principles and definitions of the law of international 
watercourses are, as seen above; the definition of the watercourse as a system of waters 
and the international watercourse as a watercourse that is in physical contact with the 
territory of more than one state; the principle of equitable utilization as the ruling principle 
for the allocation of the watercourse, according each watercourse state an equal right to 
utilize the watercourse, implying a duty to cooperate, and demanding a holistic evaluation 
of the shared usage based on all relevant factors; in virtue of being a principle of applicable 
international law, the principle also restricts the sovereignty of the riparian states and their 
free utilization of an international watercourse on their territory. 
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These principles and definitions are customary international law, and thereby applicable to 
all members of the international community. A condition for an agreement between the 
three states is naturally that they accept these principles and definitions, and let them 
constitute the basis for the agreement. Turkey must thus accept that the Tigris-Euphrates is 
an international watercourse, which also implies that the principle of equitable utilization 
restricts Turkey’s freedom to utilize the watercourse on her own territory. And Iraq must 
accept that the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers together forms one single watercourse and 
must be treated as a whole. Naturally, these basic understandings are economically 
disadvantageous for Turkey and Iraq; treating the watercourse as transboundary would 
give Turkey a larger freedom to exploit its resources, and treating only the Euphrates as an 
international watercourse would allow Iraq to utilize the Tigris freely and undisturbed.  
These are not insignificant economic losses, and the states’ resistance towards them is 
understandable. Iraq has for instance utilized the Tigris quite independently for centuries, 
since the river is mainly situated on Iraqi territory. However, by agreeing on the basic 
principles, the economic disadvantages will be an important factor in the determination of 
the equitable utilization, since the definitions would interfere with Turkey’s and Iraq’s 
existing uses and potential uses of the watercourse. But in a difficult neighbouring climate, 
it is difficult to renounce this amount of sovereignty, which brings up the other central 
ingredient for an agreement, namely trust. 
  
Cooperation is fundamental for an equitable utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates watercourse. 
And successful cooperation requires that the parties trust each other, and that old rivalry 
and power structures are prevented from influencing the agreement. One possible way to 
achieve this is by third party-negotiation, as was carried out by the United States towards 
Jordan and Israel in 1954 through the Johnston Plan, and in the 1994 peace treaty between 
the same parties.239 Having a neutral third party to lead the negotiations and witness the 
agreement, could avoid mistrust among the watercourse states and ensure the fulfilment 
of the agreement. Nonetheless, the Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works 
declares in the Turkey Water Report that due to the particular “social, economic, 
developmental, cultural and historic aspects” of each transboundary water, “the 
involvement of third parties cannot be fruitful for the settlement of any disputes”.240 The 
report further states that mediation is not an option either, because “each country has its 
own priorities, which would only complicate the situation”.241 Third party negotiation or 
mediation is of course not an option unless all three parties agree to it.  
 
The other possible way to reach a trustful trilateral agreement is through the Joint 
Technical Committee. The committee was revived in 2007, and the parties agreed in 2009 
to “share data (current and historical) regarding meteorological patterns and water quality 
in the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers”.242 Although broadly formulated, the parties agree on 
a common intention to cooperate on a technical level. A similar declaration was made by 
Turkey and Iraq in 2011, namely to “have technical meetings for exchange of experience, 
data and information without any prejudice to the work within the existing trilateral 
cooperation framework between Turkey, Iraq and Syria”.243 
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The mandate for the second JTC, from 1980 to 1993, was to determine “the methods and 
procedures, which would lead to a definition of the reasonable and appropriate amount of 
water that each country would need from both rivers”.244 The present JTC has started more 
modestly, by agreeing on the exchange of data and meteorological patterns, and maybe 
would reconsideration of the JTC’s mandate be appropriate. The committee could be a 
valuable forum for cooperation and coordination, and a means to expand the negotiation 
beyond the strict allocation of water. The equitable utilization of the Tigris-Euphrates 
watercourse is a process that extends into several other fields, for instance agriculture, 
trade, hydropower, reduction of poverty and prevention of waterborne diseases, to 
mention some. By applying a more horizontal approach, the JTC could be a broader 
resource management forum, and improve the socio-economic development in the river 
basin as a whole.245  
 
The focus of the watercourse states and of the JTC must be on the progressive 
development and the mutual interests in the watercourse. A good idea could be, as 
suggested by Kibaroglu and Scheumann, to shift the attention from the allocation of water 
to the allocation of benefits.246 A horizontal and regional perspective on the water 
management could exploit the resources more optimally and at the same time focus on 
sustainability and common profit. This would of course ultimately require a solid legal 
framework, and a renunciation of sovereignty in favour of the common benefit and 
common management of the watercourse. Although such a regime may seem somehow 
utopian in light of the present situation, determining the goals and aims of the rising 
cooperation could spread hope and good-will amongst the riparian states and thus help the 
trust and progress. 
 
Returning to the main research question and the aim of the thesis, the main observation 
throughout the examination is that neither Turkey, Syria nor Iraq argues in complete 
harmony with the applicable international law. All three riparians have some arguments 
that are in accordance with the common definitions and the principle of equitable 
utilization, and some arguments that are not within its limits. No state’s claims are in 
constantly in harmony with the principle. 
 
The most appropriate conclusion is thus that the legal arguments of the parties to the 
Tigris-Euphrates watercourse are partly in accordance with the applicable international law. 
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